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IS VOTING-RIGHTS LAW NOW AT WAR WITH
ITSELF? SOCIAL SCIENCE AND VOTING
RIGHTS IN THE 2000s
RCHARD H. PILDES*
As the redistricting of the 2000s commences, voting-rights law is at
a critical juncture. Changes in constitutional law during the 1990s,
as well as shifts in voting behavior during that decade, raise novel
and profound challenges to how the Voting Rights Act and the
Constitution will be applied to the mix of race and politics in the
current redistricting. In the 1990s, voting-rights law required the
creation of "safe" majority-minority districts in which minority
voters constituted an electoral majority. Social science evidence on
the eve of the 2000 redistricting suggests instead that today, in
many places, "coalitional" districts, in which minority voters
constitute a third of voters or more, but not a majority, are now
sufficient to ensure minority communities an equal opportunity to
elect candidates of their choice. This has come about because
white voters now appear willing, in many places, to vote for black
candidates at higher levels than a decade ago. For constitutional
purposes, there are now questions about whether the safe districts
of the 1990s can survive strict scrutiny in the 2000s, if coalitional
districts are sufficient to ensure equal electoral opportunity. For
Voting Rights Act purposes, there are now questions about
whether the Act either requires or permits such coalitional districts.
This Article first explores the critical legal issues that will emerge
in the 2000 redistricting process, in light of changes in the law and
in voting behavior in the 1990s. The Article then questions
whether the policies of the Voting Rights Act, which might be
thought to favor coalitional districts where they are sufficient to
ensure equal electoral opportunity, will nonetheless be in tension
with judicial administration of the Act, which might continue to
require safe minority election districts.
* Professor of Law, New York University School of Law. This is an expanded
version of comments originally given at the North Carolina Law Review's Symposium,
Democracy in a New America, held February 17,2001. See 79 N.C. L. REV. 1203 (2001). I
am particularly indebted to Sam Hirsch, of Jenner & Block in Washington, D.C., for
detailed readings and incisive comments, many of which have helped frame the issues
discussed here. Richard Briffault, Bernie Grofman, Sam Issacharoff, and Heather Gerken
also reshaped this piece through their substantive responses to earlier versions.
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Law and social science are perhaps nowhere more mutually
dependent than in the voting-rights field. Empirical studies in this
area are not merely of evidential significance; nor is cutting-edge
social-scientific research simply a relevant resource to which litigants
and courts might turn as one potential tool for interpreting and
applying the law. Instead, the critical elements of the cause of action
that the Voting Rights Act ("VRA")' creates are defined in terms of
legal concepts that necessarily must be given content through the kind
of data that social-scientific analysis makes available. The VRA
addresses the aggregate behavior, not of individual voters or state
actors acting in isolation, but of groups of white and black (and other
minority) voters whose combined patterns of voting behavior are the
law's focal point. The critical legal question in most cases,
particularly those involving redistricting, is whether group voting
behavior is "racially polarized" in specific jurisdictions and if so, to
what extent. Determining whether voting is "racially polarized" is
the central element in establishing the key legal predicate of liability
for whether election structures impermissibly dilute minority voting
power.2 If voting is racially polarized, jurisdictions become legally
1. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1994).
2. See generally Samuel Issacharoff, Polarized Voting and the Political Process: The
Transformation of Voting Rights Jurisprudence, 90 MICH. L. REv. 1833 (1992) (chronicling
the doctrinal developments by which the element of "racially polarized" voting came to be
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obligated, within certain constraints, to design their political
institutions in ways that counter this pattern of polarized voting. The
resolution of these questions shapes the fundamental design of our
basic representative institutions, from city councils to the United
States Congress.
But voting-rights law depends directly upon social-scientific
analysis for other reasons as well. Voting-rights law is also uniquely
responsive to changes in empirical findings as new data become
available. In this respect, voting rights law stands in sharp contrast to
other areas of constitutional law in which empirical insights might be
relevant to legal doctrine, but sporadically or contingently. In more
conventional areas of constitutional law, once a court establishes
principles of law based on empirical facts (or even assumptions about
those facts), it is notoriously difficult to get the court to revisit the
issue based on claims that new social-scientific work shows those facts
and assumptions now to be faulty But constitutional principles
require the redrawing of virtually every legislative election district,
for every representative body in the country with "general
governmental powers,"4 every ten years. And to know whether those
districts comply with both the statutory and constitutional constraints
that now regulate the entire process, courts and others must act on
the basis of current patterns of actual voting behavior among various
groups of voters. As a result, in the voting-rights field, there is an
automatic, constitutionally grounded trigger that requires a decade-
by-decade updating of the law's application based on the most current
social-scientific findings on such things as the extent of racially
polarized voting patterns. This legal requirement also generates
unique incentives for social scientists to re-examine the state of
the central question in application of the Voting Rights Act during the 1980s). As
Issacharoff points out, the concept of polarized voting, or racial bloc voting, had been
central to the way social scientists operationalized the concept of vote dilution, but not to
the legal definition of vote dilution until Congress amended the Voting Rights Act in 1982
and the Supreme Court then "fastened on the polarized voting inquiry as the heart of a
vote dilution claim," id. at 1850, in Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
3. For an exploration of the role of empirical facts in the development of
constitutional rules, see generally Rachael N. Pine, Speculation and Reality: The Role of
Facts in Judicial Protection of Fundamental Rights, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 655 (1988). Most
areas of constitutional law do not have an "action forcing" mechanism, comparable to the
requirement of decennial districting, that forces the law to re-examine rules based on
empirical assumptions or facts that have changed since a rule or doctrine was initially
established.
4. The Court extended the one-person, one-vote requirement to local governmental
bodies that exercised "general governmental powers" or "important governmental
functions" in Hadley v. Junior College District, 397 U.S. 50, 53-54 (1970), and Avery v.
Midland County, 390 U.S. 474,485-86 (1968).
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knowledge regarding voting behavior at the start of each new decade
of redistricting. Various actors in the redistricting process-
politicians, independent redistricting commissioners, consultants,
lawyers, and ultimately state and federal judges-then in turn become
legally bound to take this new state of social-scientific knowledge in
creating and evaluating the design of political institutions for the
coming decade.
But if the domains of law and social science are interpenetrating
in unique ways in the voting-rights field, these domains nonetheless
also are motivated by distinct concerns and respond to distinct
internal imperatives as well. Each domain is constituted by a set of
internal, organizing purposes and constraints; these purposes and
constraints can generate tension between law and social science,
rather than conflict-free cohabitation. One difference is that social
scientists tend to operate more directly through a model of social
engineering; given a set of objectives the law defines, social scientists
often seek the most functional way of realizing those objectives.
Doing so might require urging courts to make highly contextual, case-
specific judgments based on detailed immersion in the full factual
complexities of the particular issue. But the law often, for justifiable
reasons, declines these invitations. Law often operates with cruder
tools than those of social science-not because law is less
sophisticated, but because it responds to distinct institutional and
other pressures. Courts must not just decide cases before them, but
also generate legal rules that provide appropriate guidance for the
hundreds of cases that might raise similar issues. Moreover, courts in
voting-rights cases must construct a legal framework not just for
lower courts, but for political and other actors who, in the first
instance, must make decisions each decade about how to design
representative institutions. Tension therefore arises-particularly in
the voting-rights field-between the tendency of the law to seek
bright-line, easily administrable, and therefore more formalistic rules,
and the tendency of social scientists to seek a more functional, and
less formal, model of optimal institutional design in each and every
context.
In addition, in cases involving the raw distribution of political
power, courts are particularly drawn to bright-line, formal rules
precisely because rules of this sort might mitigate the tension between
a necessary judicial role in this area and the risk that courts will
appear to be partisan players in the most political act of all: designing
representative institutions and allocating political power. Legal
principles that allow for too great a functional, case-by-case analysis
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run the risk of not seeming to detach courts enough from the
intensely partisan struggles that the law seeks to moderate. After
Bush v. Gore,5 courts might feel even greater pressure to administer
the law of politics through formal, bright-line rules that appear to
distance the courts from underlying struggles over political power.
This tension between formal and functional considerations is
likely to intensify during the 2000 round of redistricting and the
predictable wake of litigation that will follow. Social scientists tend to
emphasize accuracy of analysis in each individual context; in social
science, a "rational" approach typically takes the form of a
thoroughgoing functional analysis that examines how voters function
in each specific context to which the law might apply. But legal
"rationality" often includes a central role for more formal, bright-line,
easily administered rules. Sociologist Arthur Stinchcombe defines
formality as "abstractions that govern."6 And although "formality"
has become a term of indictment, perhaps because it has come
regularly to be conceived and discussed in terms of its pathologies,
Stinchcombe rightly recognizes that formality is central to law and
can have a well-justified, functional role.7 But that understandable
formalism will bring legal results into tension with social-scientific
prescriptions.
Furthermore, when social scientists interact with voting-rights
law, they often isolate a discrete legal question and organize their
inquiry around that particular question. Their data collection and
analysis is oriented toward suggesting how that particular question, in
light of the data, ought to be answered. This kind of work, again for
understandable disciplinary reasons, rarely considers the web of legal
issues surrounding the particular issue being isolated. Social scientists
are unlikely to address the complex interrelation among legal issues;
they might fail to appreciate that the way the law addresses one
question might have implications for an array of other, related
questions-and that these implications will reflect back on how courts
are likely to approach any one particular isolated issue. This
disciplinary tendency is evident in social science work on voting
rights, particularly as voting-rights law has become more imbricated
5. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
6. ARTHUR L. STINCHCOMBE, WHEN FORMALITY WORKS: AUTHORITY AND
ABSTRACTION IN LAW AND ORGANIZATIONS 43 (2001).
7. Id. at 2 ("I argue that a clearer understanding of how formality works to
accurately and usefully reflect substance will allow us to see. . . that at its best [formality]
does better with the substance than we could do informally.").
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and as any one issue has likely gravitational or direct effects on many
others.
In light of both the promise social-scientific analysis already has
had for voting-rights law, and the tension that nonetheless exists
between law and social science, the aim of this Article is to explore
the coming relationship, in the 2000s redistricting, between law and
social science. During the 1990s, the constitutional law framework of
redistricting changed dramatically with respect to the permissible role
for racial considerations in that process. In addition, the more
general constitutional law regarding race-conscious public policies
also changed in ways that will bear on the coming redistricting. From
the social-scientific side, the first systematic studies of voting patterns
during the 1990s similarly reveal dramatic changes from the previous
decade. The 1990s saw the real emergence of a robust, genuine two-
party political system across most election contests in the South for
the first time in over a century. Among the consequences are a
Republican Party that has attracted a large percentage of white
voters, a Democratic Party whose electorate in the South is
increasingly black, and a significant percentage of white voters
(roughly around one-third)8 who regularly cast votes for black
candidates running against white competitors.
How should these developments of the 1990s, legal and political,
affect the design of democratic institutions over the next decade?
This Article is designed to suggest some of the new legal questions
that likely will emerge from the convergence of the legal
developments and social-scientific findings of the 1990s. The legal
issues I explore here center around the role of what I call
"coalitional" versus "safe" minority election districts. "Safe districts"
were the legally required strategy for complying with the VRA in the
1990s. Safe districts are those in which a majority of the voting-age
population is made up of minority voters. By making a minority the
actual majority in an election district, safe districting can ensure that
minority voters control the outcome in such districts. Coalitional
districts, instead, are those with a significant minority population and
white voters who are willing to form interracial political coalitions in
support of minority candidates. When coalitional districts exist or can
be created, they can also elect minority candidates, but through
interracial coalitions. The interesting legal issues to emerge in the
current round of redistricting will be how the VRA and the U.S.
Constitution ought to apply to the choice between coalitional and safe
8. For the specific data, see infra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
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districts in the 2000s. My aim is to identify these novel legal issues
and reflect on the questions they raise.
Finally, this Article will step back from the legal and social-
scientific questions to assess more broadly the kind of politics and
political culture that voting-rights law might now generate. Ironically,
the result might be that the way in which courts apply this law in the
2000s will undermine the very purposes that voting rights seeks to
realize. The law's purposes, and the concrete constraints on actual
judicial administration of doctrines designed to realize those
purposes, might be in such tension that voting-rights law will be at
war with itself in the first decade of the 2000s.
I. SOCIAL SCIENCE DEVELOPMENTS ON THE EVE OF
REDISTRICTING 2000
A. 1990
The 1990s redistricting was the first to take place under the
requirements of the major amendments to the VRA that Congress
made in 1982. Those amendments established a "results" test for
determining when the constitutional right to vote had been abridged.9
According to the text of those amendments, a group's right to vote
was illegally abridged "if, based on the totality of the circumstances, it
is shown that... [members of a protected class of minority-group
citizens] have less opportunity than other members of the electorate
to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of
their choice.""0  As the Supreme Court soon construed the 1982
Amendments, they required jurisdictions to avoid redistricting plans
that diluted the voting power of minority voters if those voters were
politically cohesive, voting was regularly polarized along racial lines,
9. See Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 2, 79 Stat. 437 (1965)
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1982)). In light of recent decisions involving
judicial enforcement of limitations on Congress's power to enforce the Fourteenth
Amendment, see, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997), the question of
whether the results test of the 1982 Amendments is within Congress's powers to enforce
the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments has re-emerged as a serious constitutional
issue. For discussion of lower court treatment of the constitutionality of the 1982
Amendments, see SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF, PAMELA S. KARLAN, & RICHARD H. PILDES,
THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY: LEGAL STRUCTURE OF THE POLITICAL PRocEss 741-45,
859-66 (2001). See generally Pamela S. Karlan, Two Section Twos and Two Section Fives:
Voting Rights and Remedies after Flores, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 725 (1998) (discussing
the constitutional exercise of congressional power under sections 2 and 5 of the Voting
Rights Act). The Supreme Court has not yet directly addressed the constitutionality of
amended section 2.
10. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1994).
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and the minority community was "sufficiently large and
geographically compact" enough that an alternative redistricting plan
could be drawn that countered the effects of this polarized voting."
"Racially polarized voting," as a Supreme Court plurality defined it,
"refers only to the existence of a correlation between the race of
voters and the selection of certain candidates,"' 2 when that
correlation is strong enough that white voters can regularly defeat the
candidates that black voters prefer.' 3  This definition, though not
without controversy, remains the law. 4
On the eve of a new decade's redistricting, the relevant data for
whether voting is racially polarized necessarily will refer back to the
prior decade's elections. When the 1990s redistricting commenced,
election data from throughout the 1980s revealed that racially
polarized voting, as the Court defined it, was a pervasive fact of
political life. The most monumental study of these patterns, Quiet
Revolution in the South, focused on the region ("the South") that had
been the target of the original 1965 VRA's "special coverage"
provisions. 5 As I have noted elsewhere:
11. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50-51 (1986). Justice Brennan delivered the
Court's opinion, but only Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens joined this portion.
12. Id. at 74.
13. Id. at 48-49.
14. Under the prevailing definition of racially polarized voting, courts and statisticians
do not inquire into the reasons for the divergent candidate preferences of black and white
voters. In an important concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor argued that analysis of
those reasons should be part of the legal inquiry into whether voting was polarized to a
legally relevant extent: "I believe Congress also intended that explanations of the reasons
why white voters rejected minority candidates would be probative of the likelihood that
candidates elected without decisive minority support would be willing to take the
minority's interests into account." Id. at 100 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Thus, Justice
O'Connor suggested that liability would exist if those reasons were shown to reflect racial
animosity, but not if they reflected divergent political or partisan interests among racial
groups. At least one lower court has taken up this suggestion and concluded that where
the record "indisputably proves that partisan affiliation, not race" best explains what are
otherwise racially divergent candidate preferences, the Voting Rights Act is not violated.
League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Clements, 999 F.2d 831, 850 (5th Cir. 1993) (en
bane), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1071 (1994). Given Justice O'Connor's current pivotal
position on voting rights cases, it is certainly possible that the Court will revisit the
concepts of racially polarized voting and impermissible vote dilution in the cases that
emerge from the 2000 redistricting. This Article works with these legal concepts as they
have been defined since Gingles and remain understood today.
15. See generally QUIET REVOLUTION IN THE SOUTH (Chandler Davidson &
Bernard Grofman eds., 1994) (documenting polarized voting patterns in the South).
Although this book was published after the 1990s redistricting, the data it synthesized in
comprehensive form was consistent with the results in more narrowly drawn studies
regarding elections in these jurisdictions during the 1980s. The seven states originally
covered by the 1965 Act's triggering formula for special-coverage provisions were
Alabama, Alaska, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, and Virginia; twenty-
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[O]nly 1% of all Southern state legislative districts with
White majorities elected a Black legislator .... The
majority of Southern states did not elect a single Black state
legislator from any majority-White district. In state and
local elections in Georgia during the 1980s, an average of
86% of White voters voted for the White opponent of a
Black candidate. In Mississippi, no Blacks were elected to
city councils in districts with less than a 50% Black
population; indeed, until Black populations in these districts
reached at least 65%, Blacks remained dramatically
underrepresented .... In South Carolina, a separate study
of 130 elections between 1972 and 1985 at the county, state,
and congressional levels [revealed that, where White and
Black candidates competed,] Whites on average cast 90% of
their votes for the White candidate, whereas Blacks cast
85% of their votes for the Black candidate.1
6
For congressional elections nationwide, it was similarly true that
at most, 1% of majority-white congressional districts elected a black
candidate to Congress.' From 1972 to 1992, the probability of a
majority-white congressional district electing a black representative
remained at this negligible level regardless of a district's median
family income, its percentage of high school graduates, the region of
the country, or the proportion of residents who were urban, elderly,
six counties in North Carolina were also covered originally, as well as three in Arizona,
one in Hawaii, and one in Idaho. As leading researchers put it in 1992, "[u]npalatable as it
may be, the simple truth is that at the congressional and state legislative level, at least in
the South, blacks are very unlikely to be elected from any districts that are not majority
minority, and most majority-black legislative districts and all majority-black congressional
districts now elect black officeholders." BERNARD GROFMAN ET AL., MINORITY
REPRESENTATION AND THE QUEST FOR VOTING EQUALITY 134 (1992) (citation
omitted). See generally Bernard Grofman & Lisa Handley, The Impact of the Voting
Rights Act on Black Representation in Southern State Legislatures, 16 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 111
(1991) (showing no decline in racially polarized voting in the South between 1965 and
1985).
16. Richard H. Pildes, The Politics of Race, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1359, 1368-70 (1995)
(book review) (citations omitted) (assembling in a more accessible form certain of the
central findings of the individual state studies in QUIET REVOLUTION IN THE SOUTH,
supra note 15). In the most important case of the 1980s, North Carolina elections for the
state legislature were found to be characterized, on average, as ones in which "81.7% of
white voters did not vote for any black candidates in the primary election and that two-
thirds of white voters did not vote for black candidates in general elections." Gingles, 478
U.S. at 59 n.28. The difference between primary and general elections, in an era in which
a higher percentage of the Democratic Party primary electorate was white than in the
2000s, illustrates what this Article will soon discuss: how much has changed in the 2000s
now that black voters constitute a much higher percentage of the Democratic Party
primary electorate in states like North Carolina.
17. See Pildes, supra note 16, at 1375.
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foreign born, or residents of the relevant state for more than five
years.18  In the last congressional election before the 1990
redistricting, every majority black congressional district in the South
(out of four) elected a black candidate to office; only one nonmajority
black district in the South (out of 112) elected a black candidate.19
VRA liability requires proof that the specific jurisdiction at issue
manifests systematic polarized voting along racial lines.2° But these
numbers were typical of the pattern in most election districts with
significant black voting populations. 2' As a result of these polarized
voting patterns, black voters effectively had to be a majority in most
election districts in the country to be able to elect a black candidate to
office.' But both social scientists and courts took the view that, as a
functional matter, a mere black population majority was not enough
18. DAVID LUBLIN, THE PARADOX OF REPRESENTATION: RACIAL
GERRYMANDERING AND MINORITY INTERESTS IN CONGRESS 41-45 (1997).
19. Bernard Grofman et al., Drawing Effective Minority Districts: A Conceptual
Framework and Some Empirical Evidence, 79 N.C. L. REV. 1383, 1391 n.32 (2001).
20. See, e.g., Gingles, 478 U.S. at 78-79 (requiring "an intensely local appraisal" of
electoral dynamics in particular jurisdictions to establish liability under the VRA).
21. For an apparent exception, see Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U.S. 146, 158 (1993)
(unanimously rejecting a VRA complaint because plaintiffs had not proven racially
polarized voting existed in the relevant areas of Ohio).
22. One of the many unresolved tensions in voting rights law is how courts ought to
identify "candidates of choice," which the minority community prefers. Writing only for a
plurality on this issue in Gingles, Justice Brennan took the view that the race of the
candidate was not important to polarized voting analysis. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 67-70.
Justice White strongly disagreed on this point, id. at 83 (White, J., concurring), along with
Justices O'Connor, Powell, Rehnquist, and Chief Justice Burger, id. at 101 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring). Most courts include all contests, but conclude that black versus white
candidate races have greater "probative value." See, e.g., Buchanan v. City of Jackson,
683 F. Supp. 1515, 1531 (W.D. Tenn. 1988). Several courts have rejected Justice
Brennan's approach and looked only to races in which black candidates are pitted against
white candidates. See, e.g., Barnett v. Chicago, 141 F.3d 699, 703 (7th Cir. 1988) (holding
that black versus white candidate contests must be used to assess polarized voting);
Citizens for a Better Gretna v. City of Gretna, 834 F.2d 496,502 (5th Cir. 1987). Yet some
courts have concluded that examining only black-white election contests is itself a "species
of racialism" and that no "legal rule should presuppose the inevitability of electoral
apartheid." NAACP v. City of Niagara Falls, 65 F.3d 1002, 1015-16 (2d Cir. 1995). As a
result, these courts consider white-black contests. See, e.g., Jenkins v. Red Clay Consol.
Sch. Dist., 4 F.3d 1103, 1129 (3d Cir. 1993); Sanchez v. Bond, 875 F.2d 1488, 1495 (10th
Cir. 1989); see also Nipper v. Smith, 39 F.3d 1494, 1540 (11th Cir. 1994) (en banc)
(plurality opinion of Tjoflat, C.J., joined by Anderson, J.) (finding that elections involving
black candidates provide the greatest probative evidence for determining minority voting
opportunities). The text refers to jurisdictions where voters are either black or non-
Hispanic whites. When a district contained a substantial (non-Cuban) Hispanic
population, in addition to a black population, Hispanic voters on the eve of the 1990s
voted often enough with black voters that black populations of less than 50% were
sufficient to elect black candidates. For more specific debate and data on the role of
black-Hispanic coalitions in electing black candidates to office, see infra note 38.
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in itself. For several reasons, which perhaps have different normative
implications, black population figures are considerably higher than
the percentage of black voters who actually cast a ballot on election
day. First, black populations tend to be younger than white
populations in most areas; black voting-age population is therefore
relatively lower than actual black total population figures.3 Second,
black voters tended to register and turn out in lower rates than white
voters when the 1990s redistricting took place 4 For black voters
effectively to constitute a majority on election day, then, their share
of the district's total population had to be greater than 50%.
At the extreme, some commentators and courts suggested that
the total black population in a district had to reach 65% to overcome
racial bloc voting patterns." But by 1990, the 65% rule was
considered exceptional 6 As one of the leading analyses concluded in
the mid-1990s, districts with 55% black populations were generally
sufficient to enable black voters to defeat racial bloc voting, while
districts less than 45% black almost never elected black
representatives These analyses were reflected in the redistricting
that took place in 1990: Of the seventeen majority-black
congressional districts drawn in the South, for example, the black
population in only two was 65% to 70%; more than half these
districts, nine, had black populations between 50% to 60% and six
23. See, e.g., African Am. Voting Rights Legal Def. Fund, Inc. v. Villa, 54 F.3d 1345,
1348 n.4 (8th Cir. 1995) (stating that increasing the percentage of black voters in districts is
required to compensate for lower black voter turnout rates, among other factors); Prosser
v. Elections Bd., 793 F. Supp. 859, 869 (W.D. Wis. 1992) (same); see also Ketchum v.
Byrne, 740 F.2d 1398, 1415 (7th Cir. 1984) (noting that 65% black population within a
district is the generally accepted guideline to ensure black voters a reasonable opportunity
to elect candidates of their choice); Kirksey v. Bd. of Supervisors, 554 F.2d 139, 149-50
(5th Cir. 1977) (en banc) (finding a bare majority black overall population insufficient to
meet VRA requirements where the voting age population was less than 50%).
24. See sources supra note 23.
25. The strongest proponent of this "65%" rule in academic commentary was based
on work in Mississippi. See FRANK R. PARKER, BLACK VOTES COUNT: POLITICAL
EMPOWERMENT IN MISSISSIPPI AFTER 1965, at 199-205 (1990). For judicial decisions
endorsing this view, see, for example, Ketchum, 740 F.2d at 1415-16; Kirksey, 554 F.2d at
149-50.
26. Some courts, however, continue to refer formulaically to 65% as a "rule of
thumb" for the black population required to constitute a safe district, though without
contemporary empirical evidence to support that reference. See, e.g., Barnett, 141 F.3d at
702-03.
27. LUBLIN, supra note 18, at 46-47. This data was based on congressional districts;
other elections would require their own analysis.
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had black total populations between 60% to 65%.' s Thus, a decade
ago, social science and voting-rights law converged on several critical
propositions: (1) that voting was pervasively and substantially
polarized along racial lines; (2) that black-majority electorates were
therefore required to enable black voters to overcome racial bloc
voting; (3) that black political participation, even among eligible
voters, was lower than among white voters, and that it was
appropriate, indeed, required, for the law to take these differences
into account;29 and (4) as a result, that where voting was in fact
racially polarized, election districts must have majority-black
populations, roughly around 55%, to be "safe" havens for
overcoming racial bloc voting. These principles were reflected
nationwide, from city council wards to congressional districts, in the
redistricting of the 1990s.
28. Grofman et al., supra note 19, at 1395 (providing a table of election results in
southern majority black districts from 1992-98). Grofman's compilation leaves out data
on Hispanic populations in these districts.
29. In the important Ketchum decision, the Seventh Circuit made clear that once
VRA liability was found, lower courts were required to take lower participation rates into
account and to order the drawing of "super-majority" black districts to offset these lower
rates:
Just as minority groups have a younger-than-average population, they also
generally have lower voter registration and turnout characteristics. This is not
something which can be fully rectified by good motivation and organization,
although the existence of these certainly helps. Some of the problems, at least,
spring from circumstances of low income, low economic status, high
unemployment, poor education and high mobility.
740 F.2d at 1413-16.
On the basis of these considerations, the Seventh Circuit reversed a district court
that had relied only on voting-age population figures to determine what size minority
population was required to meet the VRA for city council districts in Chicago once the
court concluded that racially polarized voting existed. In light of constitutional
developments in the 1990s, recent commentary challenges the continuing constitutionality
of the standard practice of taking lower minority turnout rates into account in designing
VRA-required districts, unless a jurisdiction can show that these lower turnout rates are
the present effects of past discriminatory practices with respect to voting. Theane
Evangelis, The Constitutionality of Compensating for Low Minority Voter Turnout in
Districting, XX N.Y.U. L. REV. XX (forthcoming 2002). Given that black voter turnout
rates have at times approached or exceeded white turnout rates in a number of
jurisdictions during the 1990s, this commentary questions whether the constitutional
standards that might now apply to race-conscious compensation for lower turnout rates
can be met in these jurisdictions. Id. Judge Richard A. Posner has also raised questions
about the "well entrenched" judicial approach of compensating for lower minority turnout
rates, which he characterizes as rewarding "groups whose members do not bother to
register or vote though eligible to do so." Barnett, 141 F.3d at 703.
SOCIAL SCIENCE AND VOTING RIGHTS
B. 2000
At least three dramatic changes have taken place in partisan
politics and racial patterns of voting on the eve of the redistricting of
2000. First, the 1990s saw the rise of genuine two-party competition
throughout the South for the first time in the twentieth century.
30
Much voting-rights litigation emanates from the South, and this
development has several consequences for patterns of group voting
behavior. On one hand, many white voters who formerly voted in the
Democratic Party now vote for Republican candidates. On the other
hand, this has made black voters an increasingly dominant portion of
the Democratic Party electorate. In Democratic primary elections,
for example, black voters in the South play an increasingly critical
role, as the Republican Party siphons off white voters. Second,
primary elections take on new importance when genuine two-party
competition exists; any analysis of group voting behavior and
electoral outcomes therefore must integrate the primary-election
stage into the analysis, given the influence primary outcomes can
have on general election results. Third, while voting continues to
show some degree of racial polarization, the degree of polarization
nonetheless permits a meaningful level of white-black coalitional
politics, and that crossover voting enables black candidates in many
jurisdictions to be elected even in nonmajority-minority districts.
Race of voters still correlates with race of candidates, but to a lesser
degree, including in the South. We must first understand these
developments before determining how they might affect the current
redistricting in light of the legal changes in voting-rights law that also
occurred in the 1990s.
Although only a few social-scientific studies of polarized voting
patterns during the 1990s have emerged thus far, those that have
appeared to point in similar directions. Of these, one of the most
important was published recently in the North Carolina Law Review
by Bernard Grofman, Lisa Handley, and David Lublin.3 1 These
authors include some of the political scientists upon whom federal
courts, including the Supreme Court, placed greatest reliance during
the previous decade's litigation.32  Capturing its principal findings
30. This dramatic change is documented thoroughly, and put in historical context, in
EARL BLACK & MERLE BLACK, THE RISE OF SOuTHERN REPUBLICANS (2002).
31. See generally Grofman et al., supra note 19.
32. Grofman was the central expert witness before the district court in the Gingles
litigation, and the Supreme Court explicitly endorsed Grofman's conception of vote
dilution and his technical means of determining polarized voting in Thornburg v. Gingles,
478 U.S. 30, 52-54 (1986). Eight other Supreme Court voting-rights cases have cited
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with precision requires several qualifications, but put in dangerously
general terms, this study concludes that about one-third of white
voters regularly vote for black candidates in primary and general
elections for Congress in the South, while nearly all black voters vote
for these candidates.3 A second important study, by Charles Bullock
and Richard Dunn, likewise reaches similar conclusions about
consistent one-third white crossover support for black congressional
candidates in the South.34  This level of white support for black
Democratic candidates in congressional races in the South is
comparable to the level of white support in the South that Bill
Clinton received in his 1996 re-election bid (34.6%) and the level of
support that black'Senate candidate Harvey Gantt received (36%) in
his hotly contested, losing election bid against Jesse Helms3 --an
election that many observers consider to have involved overt and
subtle racialized appeals. 6 These figures might suggest that a reliable
bloc of white voters in the South are voting consistently on the basis
of party affiliation, rather than the race of a candidate.3 7 At the same
time that white crossover voting is nontrivial for black candidates,
Grofman's work. See Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74, 108 (1997); Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S.
952, 1040-41 (1996); Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 912 (1996); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S.
900,924 (1995); Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997,1020 (1994); Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S.
874, 895 (1994); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 636 (1993); Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109,
135 n.18 (1986) (Powell, J., dissenting).
33. Grofman et al., supra note 19, at 1399-1400.
34. See Charles S. Bullock, III & Richard E. Dunn, The Demise of Racial Districting
and the Future of Black Representation, 48 EMORY LJ. 1209, 1240-41 (1999). The authors
concluded: "In general, we find that these [black congressional] incumbents attract about
one-third of the white general election vote, a result that is in line with levels of white
support for white Democratic candidates for other federal offices in the South." Id. at
1213. This is not to say that white voters appear indifferent to the race of a candidate;
white Democrats on average, across different types of electoral scenarios (black
incumbent, white incumbent, or open seat) have a roughly "ten point advantage" in
attracting white votes in general elections than comparable black Democrats. Id. at 1250.
35. Id. at 1237. For a detailed analysis of white and black voting patterns in the
primary and general elections in Gantt's first challenge to Helms in 1990, see Mac
McCorkle, Gantt Versus Helms: Toward the New Progressive Era?, 1 RECONSTRUCTION
No. 3,1991, at 18,23.
36. See, e.g., KATHLEEN HALL JAMIESON, DIRTY PoLrrIcs: DECEPTION,
DIsTRACTION, AND DEMOCRACY 94-100 (1992) (discussing late-campaign tactics by
Helms, including television ads linking Gantt to affirmative action).
37. Indeed, that was the conclusion of the state's expert, Dr. Alan Lichtman, in the
New Jersey redistricting. See infra notes 42-44 and accompanying text. As the federal
court summarized his testimony, Dr. Lichtman concluded that for the relevant state
legislative district elections in New Jersey, "the most salient factor in determining the
winner of these elections was not the race of the candidate, but the party of the
candidate." Page v. Bartels, 144 F. Supp. 2d 346, 361 (D.N.J. 2001) (per curiam). This
conclusion is particularly noteworthy because Dr. Lichtman testified regularly throughout
the 1990s on behalf of plaintiffs in voting-rights litigation.
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black crossover voting in contests pitting black and white candidates
is almost nonexistent. For example, in Grofiman's data for
congressional elections in the 1990s in southern jurisdictions, black
voters on average cast 98% of their votes for the black candidate.38
Because net crossover voting among groups of voters determines the
actual effects of group voting patterns, the level of consistent white
support for black candidates in southern congressional elections in
these studies during the 1990s, combined with the near-total cohesion
among black voters, has important implications for how large black
voter populations must be to enable minority voters to have an equal
opportunity to elect candidates of their choice.
Thus, Grofman reports that, for congressional races in the South
during the 1990s, 33% to 39% of a district's registered voters
generally had to be black for a black candidate to be elected,
substantially below the majority-black voter registration level that
had been thought necessary on the eve of the 1990s redistricting.39 It
38. See Grofman et al., supra note 19, at 1402 (compiling a table of racial voting
patterns for selected districts).
39. This directly conflicts with the bottom line found by some of these same authors in
work based on elections as late as 1994. Professor Lublin had earlier concluded that 35%
black districts had only a 1% chance of electing a black representative. David Lublin, The
Election of African Americans and Latinos to the U.S. House of Representatives, 1972-
1994, 25 AM. POL. Q. 269, 279 (1997) [hereinafter Lublin, The Election of African
Americans and Latinos]. Others reached similar conclusions at the end of the 1980s. See,
e.g., Bernard Grofman & Lisa Handley, Minority Population Proportion and Black and
Hispanic Congressional Success in the 1970s and 1980s, 17 AM. POL. Q. 436, 439 (1989)
(finding that black candidates have almost a certain chance of election in districts with as
low as a 45% black population). A study based on the 1992 elections for the 103rd
Congress concluded that the black voting-age population required in a district to give
black voters a fifty-fifty probability of electing a black officeholder was 40.3% in the
South; 28.3% in the Northeast; and 47.3% in an area defined as the Northwest. Charles
Cameron et al., Do Majority-Minority Districts Maximize Substantive Black Representation
in Congress?, 90 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 794, 804 (1996). In contrast, other authors found in
1985 that the black voting-age population in southern congressional districts had to be
54.88%. David Epstein & Sharyn O'Halloran, A Social Science Approach to Race,
Redistricting, and Representation, 93 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 187, 190 (1999). The difference
between voting patterns in 1985 and 1995 suggests that safe districts might have been
required in the 1990s, while coalitional districts would achieve the same ends in the 2000s.
The Cameron analysis, supra, was criticized for its treatment of all nonblack voters as
"whites," without distinguishing between whether those white voters were Hispanic
voters, who are typically more willing to support black candidates, or non-Hispanic whites.
See David Lublin, Racial Redistricting and African-American Representation" A Critique
of "Do Majority-Minority Districts Maximize Substantive Black Representation in
Congress?", 93 AM. POL. Sc. REv. 183, 183-84 (1999) [hereinafter Lublin, Racial
Redistricting]. For a reply that revisits the data and asserts that disaggregating "whites"
into Hispanic and non-Hispanic voters does not, for southern jurisdictions, change the
results, see Epstein & O'Halloran, supra, at 187-88. For similar evidence of declining
racial polarization at the local government level, a 1995 study of 2,400 cities with widely
1531
1532 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
is important to emphasize that this 33% to 39% level of white
crossover support should not be taken as a talismanic figure; the
precise patterns of polarized voting in any specific election
jurisdiction requires analysis of that jurisdiction's particular patterns.
But, contrary to another piece of conventional wisdom, this average
level of white support in congressional races, at the 33% to 39% level,
also does not appear to depend significantly on whether black
congressional candidates run as incumbents (though it might depend
on the absence of a white incumbent). In the 1992 elections, the first
in which majority-black districts had been created in several of these
states, a southern district had to have on average a 38.5% black
registered-voter population to elect a black representative; by 1998,
that average had become 35.6%. 4o Similarly, Bullock and Dunn
conclude that the black-incumbent effect does not explain the
consistent level of white crossover voting for these black
congressional candidates after they were first elected in 1992.
Bullock and Dunn note that white vote share increased for some of
these black incumbents, but decreased for others, while the level of
white crossover support across all races remained around one-third. 4'
varying populations concludes that black candidates had become twice as likely, in at-large
elections, to be elected in 1991 than they were in 1981, controlling for various potentially
relevant variables. Tim R. Sass & Stephen L. Mehay, The Voting Rights Act, District
Elections, and the Success of Black Candidates in Municipal Elections, 38 J.L. & ECON.
367, 389 (1995). Black voters still fared better, particularly in the South, in districted
elections compared to at-large elections, but the gap had narrowed by 1991 to half of what
it was in 1981. See id. This study concludes that these changes are due to a reduction in
polarized voting patterns. See id. While there is therefore reason to believe that these
patterns changed in the 1990s, there is also some reason to believe that the patterns now
being documented in 2001 were in place in 1990 and that the districts created in the early
1990s were in fact overpacked with black voters. If political "elites" (potential candidates,
donors, party leaders, journalists) had been willing to believe in the effectiveness of
coalitional districts in the 1990s, black candidates might have been winning in such districts
in the early 1990s. On this view, the real change in white willingness to vote for black
candidates occurred before 1990. As one piece of evidence for this view, one might look
to the fact that even in 1990, Harvey Gantt received 35% of the white vote in North
Carolina in his racially charged contest with Jesse Helms. McCorkle, supra note 35, at 23.
40. See Grofman et al., supra note 19, at 1408 (incorporating cohesion and crossover
in calculating the black population required for black candidate victory). In 1992, the four
districts for which this table includes data and the candidates elected are the Third District
of Florida (Rep. Brown), the Second District of Georgia (Rep. Bishop), the Eleventh
District of Georgia (Rep. McKinney), and the Sixth District of South Carolina (Rep.
Clyburn). The Grofman study does note, however, that for state legislative elections in
South Carolina, black incumbents needed districts that were only 37% black to have an
equal opportunity of victory, while black non-incumbent candidates needed 51% black
voting-age population districts. Ia at 1422.
41. Bullock & Dunn, supra note 34, at 1235. Grofman's study similarly concludes that
incumbent effects do not explain the levels of white support for these congressional
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What little data exists for state elections thus far points, at least
in some places, to a similar pattern. In the recent redistricting process
in New Jersey, generated by a State Apportionment Commission and
upheld by a three-judge federal court panel, the evidence showed that
for certain critical state legislative contests during the 1990s, 85% of
minority voters voted for the Democratic candidate, regardless of
race, while these same Democratic candidates captured on average
half the white vote (the data is for twelve legislative districts in which
most of the state's minority residents reside).4' When a black or
Latino Democrat ran against a white Republican, the Democratic
candidate never received less than 39% of the white vote (and
typically received closer to half that vote). As a result, it is today
candidates. Grofman et al., supra note 19, at 1398-1400. Others also conclude that
incumbent effects are not sufficient to explain the mid-1990s elections of black southern
congresspersons from reconfigured, majority-white, post-Shaw districts. Epstein &
O'Halloran, supra note 39, at 188-89. On average, the incumbent advantage has been
estimated as about 7%. See, e.g., id. at 188-89 (citing Gelman-King index for 1990, which
shows 6.9% average advantage); Gary C. Jacobson, The 1994 House Elections in
Perspective, in MIDTERM: THE ELECrIONS OF 1994 IN CONTEXT 1, 1-20 (Philip A.
Klinkner ed., 1996) (discussing the "Republican revolution"). This issue has been studied
extensively for the 1996 elections of three black incumbents in southern congressional
districts whose districts had to be reconfigured in the wake of Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630
(1993). See D. Stephen Voss & David Lublin, Black Incumbents, White Districts: An
Appraisal of the 1996 Congressional Elections, 29 AM. POL. RES. 141, 166-72 (2001). The
authors conclude that the incumbent effect does not appear to explain the success of these
black candidates in newly configured districts that were, by 1996, no longer majority black
election districts. For example, Representative Sanford Bishop of Georgia, a black
congressman elected in 1992 from the then-black-majority Second District, outperformed
all but one Democratic congressional candidate in the state in 1996 among white voters.
Id. at 149. Georgia's 1996 congressional elections were held under a newly drawn map
required after judicial invalidation of the 1990 districting plan. See Abrams v. Johnson,
521 U.S. 74, 101 (1997) (upholding newly drawn districts); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900,
927 (1995) (invalidating districts). Representative Cynthia McKinney, elected in 1992
from the majority-black Eleventh District, won a higher percentage of votes from white
voters in 1996 who were in new precincts that had been added to her redrawn district than
from white voters in precincts that had been in her original district (even when these
precincts are adjusted for their Democratic tendencies, as indicated by President Clinton's
1996 performance). Voss & Lublin, supra, at 170. This means that McKinney's white
support came more from new white voters than from those for whom she was an
incumbent.
These recent findings reflect a shift in view, even among individual social
scientists, about the role of incumbency in the districts redrawn after Shaw; as recently as
1999, David Lublin, for example, asserted-before the data had been analyzed-that "the
incumbency effect has helped entrench [black southern] representatives who otherwise
might not have won." Lublin, Racial Redistricting, supra note 39, at 184.
42. For the court's findings, see Page v. Bartels, 144 F. Supp. 2d 346, 352-62 (D.N.J.
2001) (per curiam). For a thorough summary of this evidence and the litigation, see
generally Sam Hirsch, Unpacking Page v. Bartels: A Fresh Redistricting Paradigm
Emerges in New Jersey, 1 ELECrION L.J. 7 (2002).
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"abundantly clear that districts with black populations well below the
talismanic 50% mark [are] electing Democrats of all races in New
Jersey;'43 indeed, every three-member legislative district in New
Jersey that is at least 22% black in voting-age population has elected
at least one black representative. 44
The rise of two-party competition in the 1990s ironically
contributes significantly to explaining the greater success minority
candidates are now projected to have in the South. As white voters
have moved to the Republican Party in the South, black voters have
become increasingly powerful in Democratic Party primaries. 45 As
long as a district remains Democratic on general election day, black
voters can effectively possess "an equal opportunity to elect;" if black
voters have effective control of the primary election, those voters will
determine who represents the district, even if black voters are not a
majority of the district overall. If a district contains a hundred
voters-thirty who are black, sixty voters in total who are Democrats,
and forty Republicans-then 50% of the Democratic Party voters will
be black, despite only 30% of the district's voters being black. Even
if nearly one-quarter of the white Democratic voters (seven of thirty)
will defect to a Republican on election day if the Democrats
nominate a black candidate, that candidate will still gain 53% of the
general election vote, if black voters largely remain unified46 (as is the
case in most contests when a black Democrat and a white Republican
candidate run head to head). By contrast, before the 1990s when
nearly all voters would have been registered Democrats in the South,
white voters would have dominated black voters by two to one in the
Democratic primary.
Are white Democratic voters willing to vote for black
Democratic candidates in general elections? The comparative rate at
which whites vote for black Democratic candidates compared to
43. Hirsch, supra note 42, at 21. New Jersey uses multimember election districts for
some of its House seats.
44. The comparable level of minority-candidate success was reached in the 1980s in
New Jersey when black voting-age population reached at least 28%. See Page, 144 F.
Supp. 2d at 353.
45. This was true in some places, though not so well noticed, even in 1990. In the
Democratic primary runoff election for U.S. Senate in North Carolina in 1990, for
example, black voters constituted 30% of the voters who turned out despite black voters
being only 19% of North Carolina's electorate. Harvey Gantt, the black candidate who
won that primary, then narrowly lost the general election to Jesse Helms. McCorkle,
supra note 35, at 20.
46. The example assumes that at least 93% of black voters (28 of 30) vote for the
black candidate, a figure well in line with patterns revealed in actual election studies. See
Grofman et. al, supra note 19, at 1402 tbl.3.
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white Democratic candidates is the "falloff rate." For congressional
elections during the 1990s in Georgia, North Carolina, and South
Carolina, this falloff rate was 9%; in open-seat elections, the average
white Democratic nominee received around 40% of the white vote,
while a black Democratic nominee received 31%. 41 In the example
above, if 9% fewer white voters will vote in the general election for a
black Democratic nominee who emerges from the primaries than
would vote for a white Democratic nominee, then the black candidate
will still get at least seven white votes, which combined with thirty
black votes, would give that candidate more than 57% support in the
general election.48 Thus, even with only a 30% black voting
population and with some falloff in white Democratic support for
black Democratic candidates, a black candidate would still be elected.
In New Jersey, the falloff rate has been found to be only 2%:
minority Democrats on average received only 2% less of the white
vote than white Democrats.4 9
Until now, social-scientific analysis of racial voting patterns and
judicial application of the VRA, largely focused on general elections,
rather than the integrated primary-general election structure as a
whole.50 Grofnan's article in the North Carolina Law Review is path-
breaking in its detailed incorporation of the rise of two-party
competition in the South, and the critical role of primary elections,
into the overall effects of racial voting patterns on electoral outcomes
today. The partisan affiliation of a district's white voters now can
hold the key to minority voting opportunities. A district that is 35%
black but 75% Democratic will elect a Democrat to office, but if
white voters prefer a white Democratic candidate to a black one, that
candidate might well prevail in the primary and then in the general
47. Bullock & Dunn, supra note 34, at 1250 tbl.9.
48. As Sam Hirsch points out, these numbers could reflect a general willingness of
southern white voters to support black candidates of their same partisan affiliation or a
process of adverse selection in which white voters unwilling to vote for black Democratic
candidates have shifted to the Republican Party and are now unwilling to vote for any
Democratic candidate. Hirsch, supra note 42, at 21 n.75.
49. In addition, even this small falloff was countered by another factor, which is that
black voter cohesion increased 4% in New Jersey when black candidates ran, which more
than offset the white falloff rate. Id. at 21; see also Page, 144 F. Supp. 2d at 36 (discussing
falloff rates in New Jersey).
50. For an early academic emphasis on the importance of this integrated approach,
see J. Morgan Kousser, Beyond Gingles: Influence Districts and the Pragmatic Tradition in
Voting Rights Law, 27 U.S.F. L. REV. 551, 578 (1993). For exceptions in case law that
emphasize the importance of primary elections, see, for example, NAACP v. City of
Niagara Falls, 65 F.3d 1002, 1018-19 (2d Cir. 1995); White v. Alabama, 867 F. Supp. 1519,
1554 (M.D. Ala. 1994), vacated by, 74 F.3d 1058,1075 (11th Cir. 1996).
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election. But if the district is 35% black and only 60% Democratic,
the district might well nominate and then elect a black Democrat.
The margin of victory for candidates in the 1990s from majority-
black election districts as compared to other districts provides
another perspective on this point. In contested elections in the early
1990s, before Shaw forced the reconfiguration of half the black-
majority election districts in the South, black representatives won
office with an average vote of 78%. In contrast, in all contested
congressional elections in that period, the candidate from the average
district won with 64% of the vote."l Thus, "safe" minority-controlled
districts in the early 1990s were considerably safer on general election
day-by a large margin-than other districts. This suggests those
black congressional candidates could have prevailed in districts less
packed with supportive voters. Indeed, while it might seem
paradoxical, making these noncompetitive districts more Republican
might enhance minority influence over electoral politics. If
Republican white voters replaced Democratic white voters, general
elections might be closer, but minority voters would be an even larger
share of Democratic primary voters. White congressional incumbents
win about 90% of the time, but when they lose, they typically do so in
general elections, not primaries. Black congressional incumbents
virtually never lose general elections today; when they lose office, it is
always because they have lost a Democratic primary.5 2 By placing
more Republican voters in minority districts in exchange for white
Democratic voters, districting plans would move toward generating
the same ratio of primary losses to general-election losses for
incumbents of all races.
53
Important qualifications must be considered, of course, in
working with this data. First, whatever the realities, perceptions can
play an important role in shaping political practices, particularly on
the "supply side."'  Even if black candidates can win in congressional
51. David Epstein & Sharyn O'Halloran, Majority-Minority Districts and the New
Politics of Congressional Elections, in CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN HOUSE ELECTIONS
87,93 (David W. Brady et al. eds., 2000).
52. The last black incumbent House member to lose a general election appears to
have been Katie Hall, from Indiana, in the 1980s.
53. I am indebted for this point to conversations with Sam Hirsch.
54. The question of how district design affects the incentives of candidates to run for
office addresses what are called "supply-side" effects of district design. Most political
science research has focused on the "demand" side: how the proportion of black voters in
a district effects outcomes. The most extensive study of supply-side effects when it comes
to racial redistricting is DAVID T. CANON, RACE, REDISTRICTING, AND
REPRESENTATION: THE UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF BLACK MAJORITY
DISTRICTS (1999). Canon's principal finding, not directly relevant to the issues discussed
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districts that are not majority black in voter registration, black
candidates might not be willing to run in such districts until they are
convinced they can win in less than majority-minority districts.
Similarly, such districts might attract more experienced and better-
funded white candidates than do current majority-black districts.
Second, black voters and supportive white voters might not turn out
in as high numbers if they do not perceive their preferred black
candidate as having a chance to win because a district is not majority
black. Most importantly, the presence of a white incumbent
candidate might well play a major role in the willingness of white
voters to support a black challenger. In the congressional contests of
the 1990s in majority-black southern districts, only one race involved
a white incumbent against a black challenger. Whatever normative
significance incumbency ought to have in VRA legal analysis, as a
descriptive matter there might be less white crossover support for
black candidates in contests that involve white incumbents. Any
assessment of district design, therefore, must take into account
whether there is a white incumbent likely to run. Finally, as noted
throughout, the central findings of these studies for congressional
contests can only be suggestive of patterns for other races; the VRA
requires jurisdiction-specific analysis, and patterns of polarized voting
might well vary not only from place to place, but among types of
elections as well.5 5 Regional variations, in particular, must be taken
into account-although recent data concludes that the patterns in the
South and non-South are becoming increasingly similar, particularly
for Congress.56
But for purposes of this Article, what matters is the intriguing
possibility, suggested by the most current social-scientific data, that
in this Article, is that the substantive political positions black candidates and officeholders
take in majority-black districts depends not only upon the demand side (the percentage of
black voters in the district) but on the racial composition of the candidates who run in the
Democratic primary. If no white candidate runs, the more centrist black primary
candidate tends to win, whereas if a white candidate runs in the primary, a more centrist
black candidate will lose to a black candidate who emphasizes what Canon calls "a politics
of difference"-meaning a candidate who emphasizes distinct racial interests and issues
more than a centrist candidate. Id. at 128-29. Canon also concludes that three-fourths of
the new black-majority congressional districts created in the 1990 redistricting elected
centrist black candidates, rather than black candidates who "campaigned on the basis of a
politics of difference." Id. at 139.
55. Grofman et al., supra note 19, at 1411.
56. Lisa Handley et al., Electing Minority-Preferred Candidates to Legislative Office:
The Relationship Between Minority Percentages in Districts and the Election of Minority-
Preferred Candidates, in RACE AND REDISTRICrING IN THE 1990S 13, 34 (Bernard
Grofman ed., 1998).
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black candidates can be elected to office, despite the presence of
significantly polarized voting patterns, in at least some districts
(including in the South) where the black voting-age population is
33% to 39% and the district is Democratic. The most striking
confirmation of these findings, perhaps, comes from the recent trial
testimony of Georgia Representative John Lewis, one of the longest-
serving black congressmen in the United States House of
Representatives and a political leader in the "Bloody Sunday" march
in Selma, Alabama, that was so instrumental in catalyzing enactment
of the original VRA in 1965.8 Defending Georgia's decision to
reduce the black voting-age population in some districts in the 2000
plan, as compared to the "safe" majority-minority districts of the 1990
plan, Lewis testified,
"[Georgia] is not the same state it was .... It's not the same
state that it was in 1965 or in 1975 or even in 1980 or 1990.
We have changed. We've come a great distance. It's not
just in Georgia, but in the American South, I think people
are preparing to lay down the burden of race."5 9
Thus, Lewis argued for a modification of the "safe districting"
strategy of the 1990s on the grounds that such a strategy was no
longer necessary to ensure black voters in Georgia of equal political
opportunity.
Whether the emerging general social science findings hold up
over time, or whether they are true for how many jurisdictions, for
which elections, in which areas, or whether they must be qualified in
certain ways, remains unclear. These findings at a minimum suggest
several new, important, and theoretically challenging legal questions
that voting-rights law will confront in this new decade. Those
questions must also be assessed in the context of the dramatic
changes in constitutional law that took place in the 1990s-changes
that might influence the interpretation of the VRA in addition to
whatever constitutional constraints they now impose on redistricting.
If black-majority districts are not necessary to overcome polarized
57. The social science literature operationalizes "can be elected" as the point at which
a black candidate would be predicted to have a fifty-fifty probability of being elected
based on past patterns of voter behavior. Less than 33% black voting-age population will
likely also be sufficient to enable black candidates to be elected in some places with
significant Hispanic voting-age populations.
58. See generally DAVID J. GARROW, PROTEST AT SELMA: MARTIN LuTHER KING,
JR., AND THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT OF 1965 (1978) (detailing the history of the Voting
Rights Act).
59. Melanie Eversley, Redistricting Map for Georgia Goes to Court in D.C., ATL. J.
CONST., Feb. 4, 2002, at 1C (quoting Rep. Lewis).
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voting, given current levels of white crossover voting support, what
are the implications for the constitutional and statutory law of voting
rights? And beyond law and social science, what kind of
representative institutions should we want to construct in the 2000s,
given what we are learning about patterns of racially polarized voting
at the start of the new decade?
II. LEGAL ISSUES ON THE EVE OF REDISTRICTING 2000
This Article will assume for now, consistent with the emerging
data, that black candidates can be regularly elected, at least in some
places, from "coalitional" rather than "safe" majority-black districts.
By "coalitional" districts, I mean ones in which the black registered
voter population is less than 50% (typically 33%-39%) and the rest
of the registered voters are non-Hispanic whites. I treat this as a
distinct conceptual category of district, one that differs from safe
districts and from "influence districts."'  Influence districts, debated
in the 1990s but not legally required, are ones "in which a minority
group has enough political heft to exert significant influence on the
choice of candidate though not enough to determine that choice."'"
The concept of influence is nebulous and difficult to quantify. In
contrast, coalitional districts do not present these same difficulties. A
coalitional district is defined in terms of actual electoral outcomes;
such a district can be specified quantitatively as a district with a
significant presence, though not a majority, of black voters, but that
has a fifty-fifty probability of electing the preferred candidate of those
60. Influence districts were understood as those in which the minority population
would constitute less than a majority of voters, but would still be able to "influence" the
outcome of elections even if the minority were not capable in that district of electing a
candidate of its choice. See, e.g., Kousser, supra note 50, at 551. Commentary and court
opinions debated whether the VRA entitled minorities to influence districts in contexts
where they could not constitute a majority of voters. Most lower courts rejected this
claim; the Supreme Court consistently sidestepped it. See, e.g., Johnson v. De Grandy, 512
U.S. 997, 1009 (1994) (avoiding the issue); Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25, 41 n.5 (1993)
(avoiding the issue); Latino Political Action Comm., Inc. v. City of Boston, 784 F.2d 409,
415 (1st Cir. 1986) (rejecting claim); DeBaca v. County of San Diego, 794 F. Supp. 990,
1000 (S.D. Cal. 1992), affd, 5 F.3d 535 (9th Cir. 1993); Hastert v. State Bd. of Elections,
777 F. Supp. 634,661 (N.D. Ill. 1991); see also Barnett v. City of Chicago, 141 F.3d 699,703
(7th Cir. 1998) (reserving question of influence districts). But see Armour v. Ohio, 895
F.2d 1078 (6th Cir. 1990), vacated and reh'g granted en banc, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 7480
(6th Cir. May 4,1990), reh'g en banc, 925 F.2d 987, 989 (6th Cir. 1991) (accepting influence
district claim). A "coalitional" district is one in which minority voters, despite not being a
voting majority, can elect candidates of their choice, given the levels of white crossover
voting. See, e.g., Valdespino v. Alamo Heights Indep. Sch. Dist., 168 F.3d 848, 852-53 (5th
Cir. 1999).
61. Barnett, 141 F.3d at 703.
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black voters. Coalitional districts require, by definition, interracial
support to elect a candidate that the black community prefers. Safe
districts differ on this front because voters of a single race-minority
voters-constitute a voting-eligible majority. If the black community
prefers a black candidate in such a district, that candidate can be
elected without any white support.
The emerging data on coalitional districts raises several issues for
voting-rights jurisprudence. Are states permitted under the VRA to
draw coalitional rather than safe black districts? Or do they remain
required, where they would have been in the 1990s, to draw safe
districts? If states cannot draw a safe black district, because the black
population is not concentrated enough to be made a majority in a
reasonably compact district, are states now required to draw a
coalitional district instead, if that can be attained through a
reasonably compact district? On the other hand, if states choose to
draw safe districts where coalitional districts could be drawn instead,
does constitutional law prohibit states form doing so? After
constitutional developments of the 1990s, virtually any move a state
might make when it comes to race and redistricting-whether it
ignores race, whether it takes race into account, how much it takes
race into account-can implicate federal statutory and constitutional
obligations as well as restrictions. Those legal questions become only
more complex if we assume that black officials can regularly be
elected from coalitional districts. I cannot purport to resolve all of
those questions here, but I will suggest answers to the most important
ones.
The most dramatic constitutional development of the 1990s in
the voting-rights field was, of course, Shaw v. Reno.62 Shaw will have
significant effects on the appearance and shape of majority-minority
districts in 2000, as it already had during the last half of the 1990s. I
believe that, because the design of districts for one purpose influences
the design of districts for other purposes, Shaw will have the more
general effect, indirectly, of constraining the shapes of districts across
the board.63 But the effects of Shaw on the appearances of districts
was discussed in academic commentary throughout the 1990s; though
the formal law remains obscure, Shaw is already being implemented
when it comes to the geographic design of districts. The new,
potential question for this round of districting, not yet discussed at all,
62. 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
63. See Richard H. Pildes, Principled Limitations on Racial and Partisan Redistricting,
106 YALE LJ. 2505,2516 (1997).
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is whether Shaw will extend, not just to the geographic design of
districts, where race is intentionally involved, but also to the voter
populations of districts. In particular, if polarized voting patterns in a
particular jurisdiction suggest that coalitional, rather than safe,
districts are sufficient to enable black voters to have an equal
opportunity "to participate in the political process and to elect
representatives of their choice,"' will it be constitutional for a state
nonetheless intentionally to design a safe-that is, majority-
minority-election district?
A. Coalitional Versus Safe Districts: The Constitutional Dimension
Theoretical as well as practical issues of judicial administrability
swirl around this complex question. The theoretical issues arise from
the still uncertain meaning of Shaw and the cases that followed in its
wake, as well as the more general constitutional law of race-conscious
policymaking. I will consider those theoretical issues first; after that, I
will turn to the judicial administrability considerations that, for
special reasons, always play an unusually central role in voting-rights
jurisprudence.
On one view, Shaw was fundamentally concerned with
excessively contorted, racially designed districts because, as the Court
put it, "reapportionment is one area in which appearances do
matter."65  Much of the language of Justice O'Connor's majority
opinion in Shaw emphasizes concerns for the social perceptions the
Court considered such districts to create. "The message that such
districting sends" to voters and representatives alike, as the Court put
it, "is equally pernicious. 6 6 As Justice O'Connor has gone out of her
way to emphasize that, in her view, this message does not arise from
the mere fact that state officials might have taken race into account in
drawing districts in an effort to ensure a more representative set of
elected officials. In this view, the mere intent of redistricters self-
consciously to create safe minority districts, at least where the VRA
requires it, does not trigger strict scrutiny or violate the Constitution.
Under the original Shaw opinion, the constitutional concerns arose
only when race-conscious districting resulted in a district whose
appearance was "highly [and dramatically] irregular," "tortured,"
"bizarre," and "irrational on its face." 67
64. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1994).
65. Shaw, 509 U.S. at 647.
66. Id. at 648.
67. Id passim.
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In light of these articulated justifications, I labeled the Shaw
doctrine as best understood to be based on a constitutional concern
for "expressive harms."'  The Court itself subsequently embraced
that characterization of the constitutional injury that Shaw
recognized.69 Expressive harms differ from more conventional equal
protection injuries in that they are not as focused on whether specific
individuals have been uniquely injured by being the object of state-
based racial classifications; individuals are not being denied a specific
benefit, such as admission to a public educational institution, or a
government contract, or an employment opportunity (or even
equality of voting power), in Shaw cases. Instead, the constitutional
harm is less individualized and more general; it resides in "the
message expressed" about citizenship when political institutions are
designed to be visibly and so dramatically race-based as the Court
construed the district in Shaw to be.
If Shaw is based on these kinds of "expressive harms," the
continued use of safe minority districts, where coalitional districts
would be sufficient to ensure "equal opportunity of choice," might
not violate the Equal Protection Clause. As long as safe minority
districts are reasonably compact and otherwise drawn within the
constraints that apply to conventional districting (few as those might
be), they would not stand out as unique, specially created districts
that subordinated all other values associated with conventional
districting to the goal of creating a safe minority district. By being
drawn consistently with other districts, safe minority districts might be
viewed by the Court as genuinely remedial and integrative, in
contrast to the districts of the 1990s that the Court judged to single
out racial considerations so uniquely as to suggest a view of
democratic citizenship that was partial and racialized.0 Justice
O'Connor has asserted that "Shaw's basic objective [is] making
68. Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Harms, "Bizarre Districts," and
Voting Rights: Evaluating Election-District Appearances After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L.
REV. 483,506-07 (1993).
69. See, e.g., Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952,984 (1996) ("[W]e... know that the nature of
the expressive harms with which we are dealing, and the complexity of the districting
process, are such that bright-line rules are not available."); id. at 1053 (Souter, J.,
dissenting) ("This [Shaw] injury is probably best understood as an 'expressive harm' .... ")
(citation omitted).
70. I have suggested that the Court's concern with exceptionally contorted minority
districts might be traceable to a view that a district of this sort "expresses a view of
political identity inconsistent with democratic ideals [and] might have the consequentialist
effect of encouraging citizens and representatives increasingly to come to experience and
define their political identities and interests in partial terms." Richard H. Pildes, Diffusion
of Political Power and the Voting Rights Act, 24 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 119,121 (2000).
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extreme instances of gerrymandering subject to meaningful judicial
review."71  If race-conscious safe districting does not result in
exceptionally contorted districts, it therefore might well not be an
"extreme instance" of gerrymandering. As a result, such districts
might not implicate the concerns that underlie the Shaw doctrine.
These districts might not trigger strict scrutiny at all.72
Yet even on the expressive harms view of Shaw, safe districts
could be argued to implicate such harms when coalitional districts
would be sufficient to secure an "equal opportunity to elect." Safe
districts are, by definition, intentionally designed to have a majority
of residents be, for example, black or Hispanic. Aspects of Shaw
could be read to raise concerns about such districts, when coalitional
districts would suffice, given levels of white crossover voting. Thus,
Shaw asserts that "[w]hen a district obviously is created solely to
effectuate the perceived common interests of one racial group,
elected officials are more likely to believe that their primary
obligation is to represent only the members of that group, rather than
their constituency as a whole." 73  Coalitional districts necessarily
require successful candidates to attract interracial support; safe
districts do not.74 Coalitional districts therefore intrinsically counter
one of the additional concerns directly articulated in Shaw itself; to
the extent these concerns play a powerful role in motivating and
justifying the Shaw doctrine, the use of safe districts where coalitional
ones would be sufficient could raise constitutional issues. Even
Justice O'Connor, the most restrained endorser of Shaw, has
described Shaw as designed to distinguish "the appropriate and
reasonably necessary uses of race from its unjustified and excessive
uses."75 Though safe districts are already being used reflexively in the
2000 redistricting, because this was the method in the 1990s of
ensuring equal opportunity in the face of polarized voting, courts
could conceivably consider such districts "unjustified and excessive"
when, but only when, the "appropriate and reasonably necessary" use
71. Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900,929 (1995) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
72. Absent strict scrutiny, the use of race in such districts would not have to meet a
narrow tailoring test; it is that test that would pose the greatest difficulties for safe districts
where coalitional districts could be shown to secure an "equal opportunity to elect."
73. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630,648 (1993).
74. Recall that a coalitional district is intentionally designed to enable minority voters
to have "an equal opportunity to elect" candidates of their choice; thus, these districts
differ from majority-white districts with racial minorities where racially polarized voting is
so extreme that no significant white crossover voting exists.
75. Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 995 (1996) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
20021 1543
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
of race to counter polarized voting could be met by coalitional
districts.
But the constitutional issue of safe districts becomes even more
pointed when we turn to the second plausible way of understanding
the principles of Shaw and its successors. Since Shaw, the Court has
also shifted the discourse of the constitutional violation at issue
toward a more formulaic, purpose-based mode of equal protection
inquiry. In Miller v. Johnson, Justice Kennedy, writing for a five-
member majority, held that strict scrutiny was required whenever
racial considerations were "the predominant motive" for the design
of a district (even if the district's design were not "bizarre" in
shape).76 Once strict scrutiny is triggered, a race-conscious district
will be constitutional only if narrowly tailored to serve a compelling
interest. And in the most recent application of Shaw, involving the
newest incarnation of the North Carolina district that gave birth to
the entire line of racial redistricting case law, the Court continued to
apply this purpose-based doctrinal analysis. Cromartie v. Hunt7'
upheld the latest version of North Carolina's Twelfth Congressional
District on the ground that its newest design predominantly reflected
partisan, not racial, motivations. Cromartie will therefore encourage
lower courts to approach the 2000 redistricting cases through the
discourse of purpose-based analysis first suggested in Miller. On this
view, the harms of excessive racial redistricting reside in the fact that
state actors have engaged in racial classification, without sufficiently
compelling justification-even if the districts otherwise respect all
other conventional districting constraints.
In other works, I have questioned whether this changed
discourse actually describes a genuine shift in how the Shaw doctrine
is applied in practice, as opposed to justified in formal doctrinal
terms.78 But if this purpose-based formula does reign over the 2000
76. Miller, 515 U.S. at 916 ("The plaintiff's burden is to show... that race was the
predominant factor motivating the legislature's decision to place a significant number of
voters within or without a particular district.").
77. 532 U.S. 234 (2001).
78. See Pildes, supra note 63, at 2537-47 (1997) (analyzing "failings of the motive-
based approach" to Shaw claims). Since Miller, the Court has upheld two plans in which
those in charge of districting have openly acknowledged that "racial fairness" had
motivated the design of the challenged districts. See Lawyer v. Dep't of Justice, 521 U.S.
567, 582 (1997); DeWitt v. Wilson, 515 U.S. 1170 (1995), summarily affg, 856 F. Supp.
1409, 1413 (E.D. Cal. 1994) (three-judge court). In Cromartie, 532 U.S. at 257, which also
upheld a district against a Shaw challenge, state officials argued that partisan, not racial,
motivations had been dominant. That there are two ways of interpreting the Shaw line of
cases, and continuing uncertainty about its precise meaning, reflects an apparent internal
division within the Shaw majority itself. Justice O'Connor conceives the doctrine as a
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redistricting process, the use of safe districts when coalitional districts
suffice might well be thought to raise serious constitutional issues. In
theory, whenever the predominant motive for the design of a safe
minority district is race based, Miller will require that district to be
justified under strict scrutiny. Even if overcoming polarized voting
and complying with the VRA is a compelling state interest in
principle, the districts created will still have to meet constitutional
standards requiring the narrowly tailored use of racial classifications.
As one influential circuit court of appeals has already determined,
Shaw requires that "a tailored response to a found violation must use
race at the expense of traditional political concerns no more than is
reasonably necessary to remedy the wrong."79 If polarized voting is
the wrong, and can be overcome with a coalitional district, will a safe,
majority-minority district be narrowly enough calibrated to achieve
the compelling purpose that, in principle, permits some degree of
race-conscious line drawing?
Considering other constitutional developments outside the
voting area during the 1990s, this question becomes only more
pressing. The current constitutional framework imposes, in general, a
strong burden on state actors to justify any use of racial
classifications-a requirement often enforced through judicial
insistence that such classifications be tightly calibrated to the limited,
remedial purposes now constitutionally demanded of such
classifications."0 Even in the educational context, where state
institutions might continue to have the widest latitude to adopt
affirmative action plans, race-conscious admissions programs have
been increasingly difficult to sustain as they come under lower federal
court scrutiny. Thus, while there is currently considerable legal
means of policing against the "expressive harms" noted above, while the other supporting
Justices conceive racial classification itself to be the relevant harm. The Shaw majority has
itself intimated divisions over the meaning of the Court's summary affirmance in DeWitt.
Compare Bush, 517 U.S. at 958 (plurality opinion by Justice O'Connor) (citing DeWitt for
proposition that not all cases of intentional creation of minority districts triggers strict
scrutiny), with id. at 996 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (asserting that this issue was not
addressed by the summary affirmance in DeWitt). As Professor Heather Gerken has
recently suggested: "Shaw is simply the product of a seriously divided Court engaged in
ad hoc judging as it tries to feel its way to a coherent rationale and a manageable judicial
standard." Heather K. Gerken, Morgan Kousser's Noble Dream, 99 MICH. L. REv. 1298,
1330 (2001).
79. Clark v. Calhoun County, 88 F.3d 1393, 1406 (5th Cir. 1996).
80. In the 1990s outside the racial redistricting context, the Court also tightened the
constitutional demands required of race-conscious public programs in cases such as
Adarand Constr., Ina v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995), and Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70
(1995).
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uncertainty as to whether the future-looking rationale of educational
diversity remains a constitutionally permissible objective, even some
lower court judges prepared to accept the continuing vitality of this
rationale have nonetheless found educational affirmative action
admissions to be unconstitutional."1 These judgments result from the
fact that federal judges, following the Supreme Court, have been
more demanding throughout the 1990s in insisting that race-conscious
programs not only be justified in constitutional principle, but that the
specific structure of such programs be tightly fitted to that
justification.
As a matter of doctrinal principle, then, the issue of coalitional
districts will pose a test to the Court's articulated commitment to
applying Shaw like any other purpose-based equal protection
doctrine.82 If strict scrutiny, with the often decisive concomitant of
narrow tailoring, is genuinely to be applied any time race plays a
predominant motivating role in the design of a district-regardless of
a district's shape or other features-then states will, it seems, be
required to show that safe districts are demonstrably necessary to
ensure "an equal opportunity to elect." But if coalitional districts are
sufficient for this purpose, how will states manage to demonstrate the
constitutional necessity of safe districts? Perhaps one of the key
provisions of the VRA will be judicially construed to require the
continuing use of such districts, either throughout the country (under
section 2 of the VRA) or to avoid "retrogression" of minority voting
power in those geographic areas under a distinct obligation to avoid
such retrogression (under section 5 of the VRA). Questions
concerning the role of safe versus coalitional districts under the VRA
are considered in the next section of this Article. But if no provision
of the VRA requires such districts, a purpose-based interpretation of
Shaw would seem to pose serious challenges to intentionally designed
81. See, e.g., Johnson v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Ga., 263 F.3d 1234, 1270 (11th
Cir. 2001); Wessmann v. Gittens, 160 F.3d 790, 809 (1st Cir. 1998); Hopwood v. Texas, 78
F.3d 932, 966 (5th Cir. 1996) (Wiener, J., specially concurring); Podberesky v. Kirwan, 38
F.3d 147, 161 (4th Cir. 1994); Grutter v. Bollinger, 137 F. Supp. 2d 821, 872 (E.D. Mich.
2001), rev'd, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 9126 (6th Cir. May 14, 2002).
82. In Miller v. Johnson, in which the Court established the "predominant motive
test" for judging racial redistricting, 515 U.S. 900, 934 (1995), the Court cited many of the
central purpose-based equal protection precedents that work out the mechanics of
purpose-based analysis. See id. at 913 (citing Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev.
Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960); Yick Wo v.
Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886)); see also Pamela S. Karlan & Daryl J. Levinson, Why Voting
is Different, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1201, 1202 (1996) (describing the Court's effort to "merge
the analysis governing race-conscious districting back into general-purpose equal
protection doctrine").
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safe districts, given the Court's stated principles, in contexts in which
coalitional districts would suffice.83 None of the first major 2000
redistricting challenges to raise this issue, the trial court in Virginia
held the state's legislative districts unconstitutional on this basis.!4
As a separate matter, it is also worth considering how Shaw
might apply-if at all-to coalitional districts. Whether Shaw will or
should apply to coalitional districts is an intriguing question in light of
the harms with which Shaw is concerned. 5 The Court has not, in
practice, invalidated under Shaw any district that was not a majority
black or Hispanic district. In at least four cases potentially
implicating Shaw, but in which the minority population was less than
50%, the Court has upheld the challenged districts (albeit not on
grounds that such districts are immune from Shaw challenges).86 One
might well think that the harms which animate Shaw do not arise
when districts are coalitional, and by definition require interracial
support, for a minority candidate to be elected. In these
circumstances, minorities must "pull, haul, and trade"' to elect their
candidate of choice, a process the Court has endorsed. In contrast to
the Court's concerns with bizarrely designed safe districts, it is hard to
see how coalitional districts could "convey the message that political
identity is, or should be, predominantly racial."' 8 It is also hard to
understand how coalitional districts could suggest to elected
representatives "that their primary obligation is to represent only the
83. Professor Peter Rubin reaches a similar conclusion in a recent comprehensive
overview of the Court's current jurisprudence on racial classifications and strict scrutiny.
See Peter J. Rubin, Reconnecting Doctrine and Purpose: A Comprehensive Approach to
Strict Scrutiny after Adarand and Shaw, 149 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 137 (2000) ("If, indeed, the
black-majority districts that were created... contained a greater percentage of black
voters than was necessary for compliance with the [Voting Rights] Act, such districting
plans-which would amount to packing black voters into districts-could not be found to
be narrowly tailored to serve the purpose of preventing vote dilution.").
84. West v. Gilmore, No. CL01-84, 2002 Va. Cir. LEXIS 37 (Va. Cir. Mar. 10, 2002).
85. The arguments in this paragraph have been assisted by an amici curiae brief that
pressed these points before the Court, though the Court did not address the points on the
merits. See Brief of Amici Curiae Congresswoman Corrine Brown et al. at 6-10, Hunt v.
Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541 (1999) (No. 98-85).
86. See Cromartie v. Hunt, 532 U.S. 234, 258 (2001); Quilter v. Voinovich, 523 U.S.
1043 (1998), summarily affg, 981 F. Supp. 1032,1035 (N.D. Ohio 1997) (three-judge court)
(declining to apply strict scrutiny to four districts where minority voters did not constitute
a majority); Lawyer v. Dep't of Justice, 521 U.S. 567, 582 (1997) (upholding district in part
because it was not a majority-minority district); DeWitt v. Wilson, 515 U.S. 1170 (1995),
summarily affg, 856 F. Supp. 1409, 1415 (E.D. Cal. 1994) (three-judge court) (declining to
apply strict scrutiny to California's fifty-two congressional districts, seventeen of which
were majority-white districts with a minority population greater than 35%).
87. Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997,1020 (1994).
88. Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 980 (1996).
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members of [the racial minority that controls the district], rather than
their constituency as a whole."89 The expressive harms with which
Shaw itself was concerned might not be thought even potentially
present when districts are designed on the empirically grounded
assumption that interracial political coalitions are likely to result.
Coalitional districts would seem to encourage and require a kind of
integrative, cross-racial political alliance that might be thought
consistent with, even the very ideal of, both the VRA and the U.S.
Constitution. Even if such coalitional districts departed from
traditional districting principles, then, there are reasons rooted in the
very theory of Shaw itself that Shaw might not apply to coalitional
districts at all.9° Unless the Court is prepared to adopt general
constitutional constraints on the shape of election districts regardless
of the predominant purposes for those shapes, Shaw-a doctrine to
address "extreme instances of gerrymandering" 91-might not apply.
But the intentional design of coalitional districts still involves race-
conscious districting, and that alone might lead the Court to apply
Shaw even to coalitional districts. Given the uncertainty about the
essential principles of the Shaw line of cases, there is even more
uncertainty about exactly how Shaw will apply, if at all, to coalitional
districts.
With respect to the constitutional implications of the more
fundamental choice between safe and coalitional districts, I have
explored two dominant interpretations of the constraints on racial
districting that emerged in the 1990s. If the "expressive harms"
reading of Shaw is correct, safe districts might not raise serious
constitutional issues, though even on this reading, one can see
89. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630,648 (1993).
90. This is most certainly not to suggest that majority-white districts should be treated
differently than majority-minority districts. Shaw's principles must be applied the same
way, of course, to majority-white and majority-minority districts, as Justices themselves
have directly indicated. See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 928-29 (1995) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) (noting that Shaw does not impose a racial double standard on districts). If a
state made a deliberate effort to form a white majority district for the predominant
purpose of making that district majority white, then if the effect of such a district was to
dilute the voting power of minorities, that district would violate both the Constitution and
the VRA. Even if that district did not dilute minority voting power, it would still violate
Shaw; anytime the predominant purpose behind the design of a district is to give one race
effective control of the district, and the VRA does not require such a district as a remedy
for polarized voting, Shaw is implicated. That is true whether a district is majority white
or majority black. But properly designed coalitional districts would, in most contexts, be
designed where the VRA would otherwise require safe districts to remedy polarized
voting, and coalitional districts would not be designed for the predominant purpose of
making the district majority white.
91. Miller, 515 U.S. at 929 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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arguments as to why such districts might. If the purpose-based
reading of Shaw is to govern, safe districts would seem in greater
constitutional jeopardy. But at the end of the day, these
constitutional issues might not be resolved solely on the basis of
doctrinal or jurisprudential consistency with Shaw.
In dealing with legal issues involving judicial oversight of
political processes, courts have also frequently been driven by the
perceived institutional imperatives of this extremely sensitive judicial
role. From the time that courts first became centrally involved in
cases involving the design of political institutions, they have been
warned, most notably by dissenting Justices, that this involvement
risks jeopardizing the separation of law from partisan politics, a
separation argued to require "the Court's complete detachment, in
fact and in appearance, from political entanglements." 9 Although
these dissenting Justices lost their principal battle when the Court
agreed to address claims involving "political rights," their concerns
continue to play a role in the Court's obvious and continual search
throughout this field for simple, bright-line rules that enable judicial
administration in this area to minimize (or appear to minimize) the
Court's deeper immersion into questions that might appear to
implicate the Court in the distribution of political power. The
remarkable simplicity of the one-person, one-vote rule, as a ready
answer to every complex question about the appropriate structure of
multichambered representative institutions, is the best known
example of this tendency.93 But as Professor Heather Gerken has
recently noted in the North Carolina Law Review, throughout the
voting-rights field, the Court has gravitated toward mechanical,
bright-line rules that only generally track the underlying functional
justifications that sustain various doctrines.94 As Professor Gerken
argues, the "salience of political structures and group dynamics ...
makes the Court uncomfortable" with rules that turn on fact-specific,
92. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,267 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
93. As John Hart Ely observed long ago about the Court's doctrinal approach to
reapportionment cases, the equipopulation rule "is certainly administrable. In fact,
administrability is its long suit, and the more troublesome question is what else it has to
recommend it." JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 121 (1980). Other
examples might include the Court's bright-line rule that internal allocations of
governmental power do not implicate the VRA under any circumstances, Presley v.
Etowah County Comm'n, 502 U.S. 491, 503 (1992), or the Court's reduction of the
complex statutory conception of vote dilution into a far more manageable three-prong test
in Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30,50-51 (1986).
94. Heather K. Gerken, The Costs and Causes of Minimalism: Baker v. Carr and Its
Progeny, 80 N.C. L. REv. 1411,1415 (2002).
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functional inquiries about actual political processes.95  While
constitutional doctrine in many other fields in modem times has
frequently taken the form of nebulous, multifactored "balancing
tests," distinct institutional pressures in the voting-rights field have
regularly inclined the Court to "simple rules for a complex world.
'96
These pressures might well trump any doctrinal or theoretical
issues concerning the consistency of safe districts with Shaw.
Consider the prospect of constitutionalizing the percentage of
minority voting population both necessary and sufficient to counter
racially polarized voting in a district. First, any empirical judgment
on this question will necessarily be induced from prior election
results, which means at best such judgment is an inductive prediction.
But political dynamics might remain in flux, and how accurate will
these predictions turn out to be-especially over the course of a
decade, the time scale on which these predictions most roughly hold
up? Judges might fear that social scientists' predictions about the
behavior of coalitional districts will turn out to be overly optimistic
about white crossover voting patterns. That fear could readily take
the form of resistance to constitutionalizing the "optimal" level of
minority populations that states are permitted intentionally to place
into districts. Perhaps some margin of error should be built into these
numbers to guard against that fear; but how much of a margin?
Second, the size of this optimal population will vary from district to
district, even if it is generally true that in southern jurisdictions 33%
to 39% of white voters regularly now vote for black candidates. To
constitutionalize a requirement that minority populations be no larger
than necessary to ensure "an equal opportunity to elect" would not
only subject every safe district in the country to the prospect of
litigation, but would also make the constitutionality of districts vary in
different areas depending on detailed analysis and predictions of
racial group voting patterns. Although the VRA already requires
courts to make these kinds of functional inquiries, judges might
perceive the costs of doing so quite differently when the obligation
would be judicially created through constitutional law rather than
legislatively imposed. Third, courts appear reluctant, as a general
matter, to make the application of constitutional principles dependent
on overtly quantitative foundations. The sense of authority is always
95. Id. at 1445.
96. With apologies to RiCHARD A. EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX
WORLD (1995).
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central to law,97 and perhaps judges believe that the authority of
constitutional law is compromised when expressed through
numbers-numbers that vary, in addition, from place to place.
For these institutional reasons, a simple rule that, where race-
conscious districting itself is constitutional, it is always also
constitutional to create a district in which protected minorities form
an absolute majority, is likely to be attractive to courts. That could
remain so even if contemporary social science convincingly concludes
that coalitional districts would be sufficient. It could also remain so
regardless of what the doctrinal or philosophical underpinnings of
Shaw might best be understood to be. No matter how powerful the
current Court's jurisprudential resistance to excessively race-
conscious public policy, the practical judicial resistance to the reality
and the appearance of entanglement in the dynamics of race and
politics might turn out to be even greater.
If courts are drawn to bright-line rules in applying constitutional
constraints on racial redistricting, that might hearten those who are
critical of Shaw itself, for mechanical rules here would limit the reach
of Shaw. But courts might similarly be drawn to bright-line rules-
indeed, the same bright-line rule-in administering the VRA. The
effect there would likely disappoint VRA proponents. The next
section turns to these issues, as well as the intricate variation on them
that the new round of social-scientific studies of voting behavior will
raise under the VRA. After those issues are addressed, we will step
back and look at the overall system of race and politics that the law as
a whole might construct in the current round of redistricting. That
construction, it turns out, might have several ironic aspects.
B. Coalitional Versus Safe Districts: The Voting Rights Act
The legal role of reasonably compact coalitional districts under
the VRA will arise in a dizzying array of forms. Are such districts
now required, where voting is polarized, if redistricters cannot draw
safe districts because minority voters are not sufficiently concentrated
geographically? Are such coalitional districts now permitted, if
redistricting authorities choose to create them instead of creating safe
districts? Are safe districts now prohibited, because they excessively
concentrate minority voters in a way tantamount to illegal "packing"
of minority voters? In areas of the country to which the VRA
attaches special coverage requirements that prohibit "retrogression"
97. See generally JOSEPH VINING, THE AUTHORITATIVE AND THE AUTHORITARIAN
(1986).
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in minority voting power, is it impermissible retrogression to replace
a safe district of the 1990s with a coalitional district in the 2000s?
I will address the most pressing of these questions. But each
potential deployment of the VRA is almost sure to be invoked by one
set of actors or another. As Professor Samuel Issacharoff has
observed recently, the fact that courts do not meaningfully police
political gerrymandering, but do enforce the VRA and Shaw,
virtually invites disappointed partisan actors to turn to the VRA and
Shaw as stalking horses for pursuit of judicial forms of partisan
advantage denied in the legislative struggle over redistricting.9 This
will be more true now than in the 1990s, for partisan actors became
more convinced during that decade, as the 1982 Amendments to the
VRA took effect, that the overall partisan consequences of
redistricting can be altered by whether, where, and how many safe
minority-controlled districts are created. Yet the very fact that courts
will be assaulted from every direction will create further incentives
for courts to resort to simple, bright-line rules when applying the
VRA, as well as the Constitution.
1. Does Section 2 Require Coalitional Districts?
As Shaw tightens the constraints on racial redistricting, the
question of whether section 2 of the VRA requires coalitional
districts will rise to the surface. Shaw closes off the principal means
used at the start of the 1990s for enhancing minority representation
for geographically dispersed minority voters: similarly dispersed
districts are now constitutionally proscribed. As a result, more
minority voters will be unable to be located in a constitutionally
constructed district, even if voting is racially polarized, in the 2000s
than the 1990s. By definition, these voters are not numerous enough
to comprise a safe, reasonably compact, majority-minority district.
But in many places, they will be large enough to be a third or so of an
election district; if white crossover voting is high enough, on primary
and general election day, these minority voters could be afforded "an
equal opportunity to elect" in a coalitional district. In light of social
science data supporting this possibility, does section 2 of the VRA, in
these circumstances, now require such a district?
The answer is yes to the social scientists who have documented
the possibilities of coalitional districts.99 As social scientists, they
98. Samuel Issacharoff, Gerrymandering and Political Cartels, XX HARV. L. REV. XX
(forthcoming 2002).
99. See Grofman, supra note 19, at 1423.
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understandably take a purely functional approach to the VRA; and
their work suggests that coalitional districts can indeed serve the same
function that legally justified safe districts served in the 1990s, the
function of ensuring "an equal opportunity to elect." If voting is
racially polarized to the extent that minority voters consistently are
unable to elect candidates of their choice, the VRA (as judicially
interpreted) requires the creation of safe minority districts. The point
of those districts is to counter polarized voting by enabling a
concentrated minority community to elect its preferred candidates.
But if such a district cannot be created, and voting is still substantially
polarized, a coalitional district would achieve the same aim, as long as
enough white voters are willing to cross over. What should be so
magical, then, about whether there are enough black voters to
become a formal majority so that a conventional "safe" district can be
created? If a safe and a coalitional district have the same probability
of electing a black candidate, are they not functionally identical, by
definition, with respect to electing such candidates? By what
reasoning could the law then treat such districts differently; if the
VRA requires a safe district, but none can be created, why should the
VRA not require a coalitional district instead?1°°
Once again, if we focus purely on doctrinal and theoretical
principles, there is much to support this view. The Court has said that
the 1982 Amendments to the VRA require a" 'functional' view of the
political process" 10' in determining whether impermissible vote
dilution occurs. Nothing in this functional approach would directly
argue in favor of ignoring the creation of a coalitional district, where
voting is polarized, if a safe district cannot be designed. As the Court
has explained this functional view, "[u]less minority voters possess
the potential to elect representatives in the absence of the challenged
structure or practice, they cannot claim to have been injured by that
structure or practice."m But minority voters can possess that
potential in a coalitional district; nothing in this pragmatic analysis
requires that minority voters be able to make up a majority in a
district. If minorities possess the potential to elect, despite polarized
voting, in a coalitional district, then the failure to create this district
100. There is a question whether jurisdictions in which coalitional districts are possible
should be understood still to be characterized as exhibiting "racially polarized voting," the
key predicate to VRA liability, if one-third of white voters regularly vote for black
Democratic candidates and do so at close to the same rate at which those voters vote for
white Democratic candidates. For a fuller analysis of this question, see infra Part III.
101. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 45, 57, 66 (1986); see also Johnson v. De
Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1013-24 (1994).
102. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 50 n.17.
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would seem to create or perpetuate precisely the functional injury to
which the Court refers.
It is true-and has been much quoted by lower courts-that in
the Court's first confrontation with the 1982 Amendments, Gingles
said that vote dilution typically demands that "the minority group
must be able to demonstrate that it is sufficiently large and
geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single-member
district."'10 3 Read literally and acontextually, this could be taken to
mean that no vote dilution that the VRA recognizes can occur unless
a safe district can be created in response. But Gingles immediately
went on to explain the reasons it adopted this "majority"
requirement: unless a safe district can be created, the "multi-member
form of the district cannot be responsible for minority voters' inability
to elect its candidates."'" But the failure to create a coalitional
district is responsible for minority voters' inability to elect, when
voting is polarized, if such a district would give those voters an equal
opportunity to elect. Thus, the general functional analysis the Act
requires, in addition to the specific contextual reasons the Court gave
for requiring safe districts in the typical case of the 1980s, argue in
favor of reading the Act to require coalitional districts, at least where
safe ones cannot be created, to overcome polarized voting.05 This is
indeed the position the Solicitor General's Office has taken."°
Yet the courts of appeals have rejected this position to date.°0
The reasons they articulate are indirect and fail to address the issue
substantively. Often, these courts simply point to the quoted
103. Id. at 50.
104. ld.
105. Indeed, Gingles was at such an early stage of analysis of the VRA, compared to
the present, that its comments arise in the context of then-common challenges to
multimember districts. Today, the more common challenge is to the design of individual
districts within a single-member districting plan. This makes all the more acontextual
treating safe districts as a talismanic requirement for liability under the VRA, rather than
as one example of the kind of circumstances in which vote dilution should be found. See
Pamela S. Karlan, Maps and Misreadings: The Role of Geographical Compactness in
Racial Vote Dilution Litigation, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 173 (1989).
106. See, e.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae United States at 11, Valdespino v. Alamo
Heights Indep. Sch. Dist., 528 U.S. 1114 (2000) (No. 98-1987) (arguing that even if voting
is polarized by race, crossover voting by the majority may give minority votes the potential
to elect their representative of choice in districts in which minority voters are less than a
majority).
107. See Valdespino v. Alamo Heights Indep. Sch. Dist., 168 F.3d 848, 852-53 (5th Cir.
1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1114 (2000); Perez v. Pasadena Indep. Sch. Dist., 165 F.3d 368,
371-73 (5th Cir. 1999); see also Negron v. City of Miami Beach, 113 F.3d 1563, 1571 (11th
Cir. 1997) (finding no section 2 violation when minority community is just below 50% of
citizen voting-age population).
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language from Gingles and leave it at that-treating the Court as
having imposed the talismanic requirement, divorced from any
underlying functional reasons, that unless a minority can be made a
numerical majority in a safe district, the VRA requires nothing
further. The other reason lower courts offer is that most courts
already rejected claims in the 1990s that the VRA requires
"influence" districts. Yet as I have noted above, this reasoning
confuses the concept of an "influence district" with that of a
"coalitional district." The two raise significantly different issues; to
dismiss claims for coalitional districts by conflating them with
influence districts is to confuse the issue, not answer it, even if that
confusion is understandable.
But that is not to say that the functional approach, requiring
coalitional districts, should or will prevail. Merely because the lower
courts fail to articulate sound reasons is not to say that such reasons
could not motivate, or justify, their conclusions (less good reasons
could also, of course, motivate these results). 0 Most of the same
reasons that might draw courts toward a formal, bright-line,
administrable rule in the Shaw context would also apply in the section
2 context. That these issues arise in a statutory context, rather than a
constitutional one, would perhaps make courts more willing to engage
in a thoroughly functional analysis. But thus far, that is not the way
judges have behaved; lower courts have resisted this functional
approach. Opening up the possibility that coalitional districts are
required would open up nearly all the same questions as would
opening strict scrutiny of district populations under Shaw-and
additional questions to boot. Exactly how large must a minority
population be, for primary and general elections, to have what
probability of success, before a coalitional district is required? And if
courts go down the road of such a thoroughly functional analysis of
this question under section 2, they will undoubtedly face demands to
take a similarly functional analysis of many other issues under section
2. Of course, courts do that to a significant extent already, but the
issue of requiring coalitional districts would involve courts at a still
further, yet more microscopic level, in the design of political
institutions. Moreover, what is a "formal" rule from the perspective
of judicial decision making is a clear, safe harbor from the perspective
108. Among the less good reasons, I would include exhaustion with the project of
administering the VRA, as the issues become more complex, and hence a desire for crude
rules just to make more cases go away-or even resistance to the VRA itself, so that rules
that decline to extend the VRA along directions toward which its functional purposes
point are resisted for that reason alone.
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of a redistricting body. The uncertainty that would be created by a
rule requiring coalitional districts, even ex ante, would be
considerable, let alone were courts to impose such a rule ex post. As
many commentators have pointed out, redistricting is already the
most Hobbesian of all legislative tasks, and one of the most
incendiary, when race is part of the mix; this context cries out for any
legal oversight to take the form of clear, readily-followable rules. For
any legal uncertainty here will become merely another intensely
charged battle site."°
Once again, then, despite powerful arguments urging a functional
interpretation of section 2, courts might reject doing so in favor of
"talismanic" rules that switch section 2 liability on or off depending
on the formal fact of whether minority voters can be made a
numerical majority in a district. And in considering whether to
reason functionally on this specific issue under section 2, courts might
consider whether they can open a functional window on this question
without opening exactly the same functional window on many other
issues under the Act."0
2. Does Section 5 Permit Coalitional Districts to Avoid
Retrogression?
One of those issues will be whether section 5 of the VRA should
also be read functionally. Section 5 imposes unique obligations on
jurisdictions that fall under the VRA's special coverage provisions. A
jurisdiction is brought under section 5's obligations if it imposed
various barriers to voting, as of certain dates, and had turnout below
certain levels."' These provisions require that these jurisdictions not
enact any new voting practice, such as a redistricting plan, if that new
109. See Pildes, supra note 63, at 2550 (discussing the compelling need in voting rights
for clear rules, given that "these cases are exceptionally charged politically, racially, and
ethnically").
110. For an explicit judicial articulation of the importance of "bright-line rules," even if
over and underinclusive, in voting rights law, as opposed to more "malleable" and
"subjective" inquiries, see NAACP v. City of Niagara Falls, 65 F.3d 1002, 1018-19 (2d Cir.
1995). As another court of appeals has put it: "The Voting Rights Act is a crucially
important piece of national legislation, but it is subject to the same considerations of
effective administration as other similar statutes." McNeil v. Springfield Park Dist., 851
F.2d 937, 943 (7th Cir. 1988) (citations omitted).
111. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1994). Under the current version of the VRA, which uses
triggering dates in 1964, 1968, and 1972, nine whole states, fifty-seven counties (including
forty in North Carolina), and twelve municipalities or townships are covered. See
Procedures for the Administration of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, As
Amended, 28 C.F.R. pt. 51, App. (2001) (listing covered jurisdictions).
1556 [Vol. 80
SOCIAL SCIENCE AND VOTING RIGHTS
practice will have a "retrogressive purpose or effect.""' 2 The effects
prong of section 5 has been the critical enforcement provision, and an
impermissible "retrogressive" effect occurs when a new voting
practice "will make members of [a protected minority group] worse
off than they would have been before the change with respect to their
opportunity to exercise the electoral franchise effectively.""
3
Covered jurisdictions, like other jurisdictions, used safe districts,
where voting was racially polarized, in the 1990s. But section 5 makes
it more difficult for a covered jurisdiction to reverse a policy with
respect to voting. Suppose such a state now wants to replace a safe
district with a coalitional district. The state seeks to establish, we
assume, that a coalitional district will now, in the 2000s, satisfy the
statutory standard of an "equal opportunity to participate and elect."
Moreover, if the now "extra" minority voters are added to a different
district, the state will perhaps be able to create a second coalitional
district, or failing that, a district in which the minority population has
been enhanced considerably and is therefore likely to be more
influential than before in the second district's elections. Dismantling
a safe district might enable the creation of not one, but two
coalitional districts. If a state carries its burden of factual proof, will
the courts construe section 5 to permit replacement of a safe district
with a coalitional one?
The issues are much the same here as those that arise under
section 2, with one possible exception. The Court has defined the
nonretrogression rule to mean that "a legislative reapportionment
that enhances the position of racial minorities with respect to their
effective exercise of the electoral franchise can hardly have the
'effect' of diluting or abridging the right to vote on account of race
within the meaning of § 5.1114 A plan that replaces a safe district with
two "minimally" coalitional ones would be one in which a cohesive
minority community formerly had assurance of electing its
representative of choice in one district and would now have a fifty-
fifty probability of electing such a representative in two districts. But
these new districts can also be designed to be more than "minimally
coalitional;" suppose they each create a 55% probability that the
minority communities' preferred candidates will be elected, based on
expert analyses of voting patterns. These analyses of course are all
112. The ban on retrogressive effects was established in Beer v. United States, 425 U.S.
130,141 (1976); the ban on retrogressive purpose was established in Reno v. Bossier Parish
School Board, 528 U.S. 320,341 (2000).
113. 28 C.F.R. § 51.54(a) (2001); see Beer, 425 U.S. at 140-42.
114. Beer, 425 U.S. at 141.
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predictive and depend on actual turnout levels and cohesiveness of
voting patterns. But taking that as given, should a plan that creates a
relative certainty of electing one minority-preferred candidate be
preferred to a plan that creates a 55% probability of two such
candidates being elected? Functionally, the second plan might
plausibly be thought, not retrogressive, but progressive; arguably, the
second plan "enhances the position of racial minorities" with respect
to the vote compared to the original plan.
Indeed, it is conceivable that minority politicians and Democrats
would favor spreading out voters in a current safe district across two
coalitional districts in a covered jurisdiction, like Alabama or
Georgia, in which safe districting is considered to have cost
Democrats critical congressional seats in the 1990s.11 But if a
jurisdiction does that, other partisan interests will lose out in this
zero-sum game, given that a fixed number of seats are to be allocated.
In particular, the Republican Party has come to recognize that the
"safe districting" approach of the 1990s favors its partisan interests,
while the Democratic Party has recognized the opposite.
Concentrating black voters into safe majorities tends to hurt the
Democratic Party across a state as a whole because too many of the
party's most loyal voters have been safely confined to one district.
We can imagine, therefore, that the Republican Party will insist on
safe districts in the 2000 round of redistricting, and that if a covered
jurisdiction replaces a safe district with two coalitional ones, with
support from minority political leaders and organizations, the
Republican Party will turn to section 5 to prevent this change. As
long as the Republican Party can find willing plaintiffs who have
standing, section 5 can be deployed as a vehicle for partisan political
interests that would benefit from continued preservation of safe
minority districts, even if those districts in the 2000s would diminish
the overall electoral opportunities of minorities. There is nothing far
fetched about this; the Republican Party is already pursuing precisely
this strategy in seeking to have Georgia's 2000 redistricting plan,
drawn by a Democratically controlled legislature, overturned on the
115. For a concrete case study of how this tradeoff occurred in Alabama, see
ISSAcHAROFF, KARLAN, & PILDES, supra note 9, at 920-24. A robust debate has taken
place in the academic literature, as in political discourse, over how many House seats
might have shifted from Democratic to Republican control in the 1990s as a result of
increases in the number of majority-minority districts. For some of the important
contributions, see LUBLIN, supra note 18, at 114; Bernard Grofman & Lisa Handley, 1990s
Issues in Voting Rights, 65 ISS. L.J. 205, 263-65 (1995); Kevin A. Hill, Does the Creation
of Majority Black Districts Aid Republicans? An Analysis of the 1992 Congressional
Elections in Eight Southern States, 57 J. POL. 384,392 (1995).
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grounds that it violates section 5 because the plan does not create
enough majority-black congressional districts. 16 The Republican
Party pursued a similar strategy in seeking to overturn New Jersey's
state legislative districting plan as a violation of section 2 of the VRA,
though that effort proved unsuccessful. 117
This potential use of section 5 for partisan advantage might be
thought to make the functional interpretation of section 5 all the
more compelling. Various interests and actors will organize
themselves around different positions on section 5 for a multitude of
reasons having little to do with the actual purposes of section 5. To
avoid becoming the instruments of these interests, are courts not best
off focusing on a purely functional analysis of section 5? Indeed, is
that analysis not required by section 5 itself, which emphasizes the
actual "effect" of voting schemes, and by Supreme Court case law on
section 5, which seems to treat retrogression as a functional concept?
To be sure, a functional analysis under section 5 could be applied in a
risk-averse way; one can argue that the relative greater certainty that
safe districts will enable a minority community to elect one
representative should be given greater weight than the probabilities
associated with coalitional districts. But in the face of strong evidence
that coalitional districts would enhance minority electoral access over
116. At the time this Article goes to press, this precise scenario has emerged in
Georgia, where a Democratically dominated redistricting process (both the state
legislature and the Governor's office are in Democratic hands) was challenged by a
coalition of four black plaintiffs, represented by a lawyer with strong Republican Party
connections. The challenge argued that Georgia's creation of certain coalitional districts,
rather than safe districts, made Georgia's congressional redistricting plan for the 2000s
"retrogressive" and therefore a violation of section 5 of the VRA. See Eversley, supra
note 59; Walter C. Jones, Statistics Rule Redisricting [sic] Trial Testimony, FLA.-TIMES
UNION (Ga. edition), Feb. 6, 2002, at Al, 2002 WL 5956890. In the peculiar rhetorical
reversals that reveal how much issues of race are intertwined with those of partisan
politics, Republican legislators in Georgia attacked the state's failure to draw more black-
majority congressional districts as a manipulative use of the VRA; Republicans argued
that the VRA "was passed to prevent the exact thing your bill is trying to do. (It was
passed) to stop using minority voters to maintain power for the majority race." Michael
Finn, Remap Discussions Focus on Black Voters, CHATrANOOGA TIMES, Sept. 8, 2001, at
B2, LEXIS (quoting comments of Senate Minority Leader Eric Johnson). Meanwhile,
Democrats and black congressional representatives from Georgia are arguing for fewer
"safe" majority-black districts and more coalitional districts. In the state senate, the
congressional districting plan passed on a virtually straight party-line vote.
117. For an account of the partisan political dynamics behind the Republican-led
challenge to New Jersey's 2000 redistricting for the state legislature, see Hirsch, supra note
42, at 23 ("Republicans attempted to champion an outmoded conception of minority
voting rights, in which success is measured solely by the number of majority-black districts
and majority-Latino districts, without regard to broader issues of effectiveness or political
empowerment.").
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a safe district, should section 5 really require the use of safe districts
instead?
Yet once again, these functional issues might well be trumped by
the preference of legal actors, such as judges or Justice Department
enforcement officials, for voting-rights rules that have a more formal,
bright-line structure. That preference is likely to be at its strongest, in
fact, in section 5 cases. The law itself established a baseline in the
1990s of safe districting; that baseline is the measure against which
new plans will be assessed to determine if they retrogress. For courts
to hold that districts they required in the 1990s are now impermissibly
retrogressive, which would be required, in effect, to permit coalitional
districts to replace safe districts, seems unlikely. Moreover, in
covered jurisdictions, in which every change in voting practices
requires federal approval, safe districts will surely be an appealing
safe harbor of certainty in a sea of complexity. This is so not just for
courts, but for all the actors who must enforce and comply with
section 5. Redistricting officials must judge, in the first instance, what
section 5 requires of them, and the Justice Department enforces
section 5 through informal preclearance proceedings.
This conflict between formal and functional approaches has
already begun to emerge in section 5 litigation. After its protracted
struggle during the 1990s with the implications of Shaw v. Reno,
Georgia ended up with a court-drawn redistricting plan that
contained one black-majority congressional district, which had a
black voting-age population of 57%.118 In the 2000 redistricting-with
support from the Democratic Party and leading black elected
officials-Georgia is seeking to reduce the black voting-age
population of its one majority-black congressional district to 52%.119
In a formal sense, this five percentage-point drop in the black voting-
age population of the State's one "safe" minority district might be
considered to constitute the kind of impermissible retrogression that
section 5 prohibits. Yet minority elected officials, including the long-
serving black congressman who represents this district, defend
making this district less of the conventional "safe" district of the
118. See Johnson v. Miller, 922 F. Supp. 1556, 1571 (S.D. Ga. 1995) (three-judge court),
affd, Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74 (1997).
119. For the data on the current districts, see http:lwww.thinkmajority.comlmaps/stats/
confcong.pdf (last visited on Feb. 16, 2002) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
For the challenge under section 5 to this reduction in population, see Memorandum
Containing Statement and Points of Authorities In Support of Renewed Motion to
Intervene, Georgia v. Ashcroft, No. 01-2111-EGS (D.C. filed Nov. 16, 2001), available at
http://www.thinkmajority.com/reapportionment/litigation/renewedpointsandauthorities.1.
5.02.pdf (last visited on Feb. 16,2002) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
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1990s on the grounds that minority voters will still have an effective
opportunity to elect candidates of choice even though more white
voters would now be in the district. But some minority voters
(represented by lawyers associated with the Republican Party) assert
that this reduction in black voting population does violate section 5.
Thus, courts will have to decide whether section 5 permits any formal
reduction in the minority populations of "safe" districts from the
1990s if these new, lower population districts are functionally as
effective as the prior decade's safe districts.
Much in partisan politics and issues of race and politics will turn
on the outcome of this clash between form and function in those
jurisdictions to which section 5 applies-many of them southern
jurisdictions with substantial minority populations. Beyond the issues
already raised out of Georgia, the next question would be whether
reducing a safe district of the 1990s to a coalitional district in the
2000s (meaning a drop in the black voting-age population below the
magic 50% mark) would be permissible under section 5. If this issue
does not arise, because no jurisdiction is willing to pursue and no
plaintiff is willing to challenge such a strategy, its absence would
testify to the power that bright-line, formal rules hold-even when
functional considerations point the other way-for numerous actors
in the redistricting process.
3. Does Section 2 Permit, if not Require, Coalitional Districts?
Even if the Act does not require coalitional districts, there is still
an important legal question of whether section 2 will permit such
districts in circumstances in which the law would have required safe
districts instead in the 1990s. One way the new social science findings
might affect redistricting is for front-line redistricting authorities
themselves to take account of these emerging results, in response to
various parties pressing for that. Courts might accept coalitional
districts that arise in this way, for in this context, courts would merely
have to defer to the judgments of political institutions, rather than to
impose and enforce functionally-oriented legal requirements on the
redistricting system. Indeed, one major three-judge court decision,
Page v. Bartels,'20 has already permitted coalitional districts to be used
in place of safe, majority-minority districts.
How freely courts might permit coalitional districts, even if they
are not required, will have to be worked out. In Page, the court did
not rely only on expert testimony and quantitative, functional analysis
120. 144 F. Supp. 2d 346 (D.N.J. 2001) (per curiam) (three-judge court).
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of actual voting behavior. The court also invoked qualitative insight
into likely effects of coalitional districts, based on the testimony of
minority political officials who endorsed the coalitional districts. 21 In
addition, the relevant plan included a number of conventional safe
districts; the coalitional districts therefore did not replace all safe
districts, only a few.122 The inevitable litigation that usually results
from the creation of such districts will have to resolve the question of
whether all these factors or only some must be present before courts
will permit coalitional districts-at least until a settled legal approach
emerges.
The practice of creating coalitional districts, in Democratically
controlled redistricting processes, is likely to be pressed in the 2000
round. As Democrats and minority officials learned the lessons of the
1990s redistricting, many came to accept that a genuine tradeoff exists
between descriptive and substantive representation:123 packing
minority voters into overly safe congressional districts in a state, for
example, diminishes the overall Democratic prospects for the state's
congressional delegation as a whole. Coalitional districts, where
possible, offer a way out of this tension. If black candidates can be
elected in districts that have a 35% rather than 55% black voting-age
population, and black candidates can be elected with 60% rather than
78% of the vote on general election day, there are more black and
more Democratic voters to go around. Coalitional districts can be
jointly supported by both minority voters and Democratic partisans-
and jointly preferred to safe districts, in the right contexts.
Democratic redistricting bodies are therefore likely to turn to such
districts, just as Republicans are likely then to turn to courts and
argue that such coalitional districts should not be permitted.
But even if coalitional districts emerge voluntarily in certain
states, and even if courts permit these districts under section 2 and
defer to the process that generates them, there are many contexts,
some explored above, in which the Constitution and the Act will still
require courts to choose whether the law continues to require and
permit the safe, majority-minority districts of the 1990s. Those
contexts will not permit courts to defer to actions of others, but will
require first-order decisions about a functional or formal approach to
voting-rights issues. No choice is easy, as this Article has tried to
suggest, but the choice will nonetheless have broad effects on the way
121. Id. at 356-57, 366.
122. Id.
123. For analysis of the data on this tradeoff, see generally Pildes, supra note 16.
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race affects political campaigns, candidacies, partisan politics, and
representative institutions.
III. COALITIONAL DISTRICTs: THE CHALLENGE TO CONTINUED
APPLICATION OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT
When eight-term Congressman John Lewis of Atlanta, who
risked his life to help get the VRA enacted, testifies in court that
Georgia and the South have "come a great distance" even since 1990
in the willingness of whites to vote across racial lines-and that the
South is "preparing to lay down the burden of race"'124 -the question
arises as to what the continuing role of the VRA ought to be. The
new possibility of coalitional districts brings to the forefront a deeper
issue, not merely of how the VRA should be applied in the 2000s, but
of whether, in some places at least, the VRA should be understood to
have realized its purposes. The law will continue to ban
discrimination in voting, of course, but the question is whether the
kind of vote dilution to which the 1982 Amendments were a response
should be viewed as absent in jurisdictions where coalitional districts
are viable. Put in other terms, the VRA has long been justified as a
necessary response to a specific set of circumstances; the hope was
that the VRA would help break down polarized voting and change
those circumstances. Perhaps the possibility now of coalitional
districts, in at least some places, shows that the VRA has succeeded in
its specific, albeit limited, goal of diminishing polarized voting (or
culture and politics have brought about the changes to which the
VRA aspired). If one-third of white voters regularly are willing to
vote for black candidates, and if those white voters vote at close to
the same rate for black Democrats as they do for white Democrats,125
should this be understood to mean that voting behavior has changed
sufficiently so that the VRA has largely achieved its purposes? The
question forces consideration of what those purposes, precisely,
should be understood to mean.
Doctrinally, these issues would be presented in terms of whether
"racially polarized voting," the key predicate for VRA liability, exists
even when one-third of white voters are willing to vote regularly for
black candidates. The Supreme Court has not yet had to specify what
precise levels of white support for minority-preferred candidates
defines the boundary between polarized and nonpolarized voting. If
half of white voters vote for candidates that minority voters favor,
124. Eversley, supra note 59.
125. See notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
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could voting be considered racially polarized? How, then, should we
think about the matter when one third of white voters vote regularly
for minority-preferred candidates-and when those preferences are
not significantly different when same-party white Democratic
candidates run? The concept of polarized voting was developed in
circumstances in which white candidates could be elected without
paying any attention to black voters or their interests; a solid, hostile,
bloc-voting white majority was overwhelmingly unified in its
resistance to black candidates. Once the white community's
preferences are significantly diverse, however, how should the
concept of racial polarization be understood? Justice O'Connor has
long argued, for example, that the VRA should recognize distinctions
between circumstances in which "indirect avenues of... influence
' '126
are likely to be open to minority communities from circumstances in
which they are not. The political dynamics of influence are likely to
be significantly different in areas where black voters and one-third of
whites vote for black candidates, as compared to areas where 90% of
whites consistently vote against such candidates.127
Supreme Court doctrine can be looked to for a partial answer on
these profound underlying questions. The "functional analysis"
required to implement the VRA since Gingles has focused on the
bottom-line ability to elect candidates of choice. If voting patterns
are such that minority voters consistently cannot elect their preferred
candidates, despite one-third white support, we might conclude that
voting should still be considered racially polarized. The concept of
polarized voting, on this view, should derive from a functional
analysis in which candidate election remains the touchstone of that
analysis. On this view, if minority-preferred candidates are not being
elected, voting is racially polarized-by definition.
12'
126. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30,100 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
127. Cf id. (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("I believe Congress also intended that
explanations of the reasons why white voters rejected minority candidates would be
probative of the likelihood that candidates elected without decisive minority support
would be willing to take the minority's interests into account. In a community that is
polarized along racial lines, racial hostility may bar these and other indirect avenues of
political influence to a much greater extent than in a community where racial animosity is
absent although the interests of racial groups diverge.").
128. See id. at 48 ("The theoretical basis of this type of impairment is that where
minority and majority voters consistently prefer different candidates, the majority, by
virtue of its numerical superiority, will regularly defeat the choices of minority voters.");
id. at 56 ("[I]n general, a white bloc vote that normally will defeat the combined strength
of minority support plus white 'crossover' votes rises to the level of legally significant
white bloc voting.").
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But this is a partial answer because it obscures more difficult,
deeper, theoretical questions. At what point, if at all, should voting-
rights law examine the reasons that white and black voters have
differing candidate preferences-particularly if those reasons seem to
reflect partisan political differences, rather than racial resistance to
black candidates? If white voters in the South vote for white and
black Democratic candidates at nearly the same rate, but most white
voters vote for Republicans over either of these options, should black
candidate defeats be viewed as a product of racially polarized
voting-or the kind of ordinary partisan loss that occurs when a
jurisdiction's voters prefer one party over the other?
These issues are perplexing and perhaps, at a theoretical level,
intractable, though the law nonetheless must make a choice. On the
one hand, it is easy to understand the argument that, in a two-party
system, if party A (the Democratic Party) is systematically supported
by minority voters, because those voters believe party A better serves
their interests, then white voters can support party B out of hostility
to the interests of minority voters (or out of indifference or genuine
differences over desirable policy). Even outright racial animus could
easily hide behind a partisan preference for party B candidates.
Regardless of the reasons white voters support party B, if those voters
are a dominant majority and can elect consistently party B
officeholders, the substantive political interests of minority voters (as
they perceive those interests) will be defeated. 29 Can the VRA be
indifferent to these consequences, even if it looks as if white voters
always reject party A candidates (black or white) for partisan, rather
than racial, reasons?
On the other hand, the VRA cannot be an entitlement to
guarantee the Democratic Party as such a certain number of seats.
Yet that is close to what it would mean to say that if a majority of
voters prefer Republicans, but a coalition of black and white voters
prefer Democrats, and Democrats (white or black) consistently lose,
then the Act requires that districts be redesigned so that the white-
black coalition be able to elect its candidates. If the concept of
polarized voting means no more than that minority-preferred
candidates regularly fail to win, regardless of the reasons for that
failure, then minority-preferred candidates possess a statutory
sinecure. Even if Democrats are losing because they are Democrats
and cannot attract enough political support, those candidates would
be entitled to office, as long as the minority community supported
129. This viewpoint is developed in Karlan & Levinson, supra note 82.
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them. A statute aimed at counteracting discrimination in voting
would thus be transformed into a substantive, partisan entitlement to
office. Can the VRA be indifferent to the reasons whites vote against
the candidates blacks prefer, even if that indifference means treating
black candidates who lose for racial reasons the same as those who
lose for partisan political reasons?
Perhaps because these issues are so difficult, the law has been
unsettled on this debate essentially since constitutional doctrine and
the VRA began to address the very problem of vote dilution. In the
first constitutional cases, the Court asserted that vote dilution
occurred only when there was a "built-in bias" against black voters, as
opposed to a situation in which those voters were simply supporting
losing candidates along with losing white voters. 3 ° The "theme" of
these original cases, as their principal author put it, was that "it is not
mere suffering at the polls but discrimination in the polity with which
the Constitution is concerned.""13  Justice Marshall distinguished
between lack of electoral success for minority voters that was "the
result of partisan politics" from that which was the result of "racial
vote dilution."'32  When Congress amended the VRA in 1982, it
endorsed the line these prior cases had drawn. 33 The Supreme
Court's key engagement with these amendments reflects deep
divisions on whether separating racial from partisan reasons for
differences in preferences between black and white voters is
appropriate. Justice Brennan, writing for a plurality of Justices,
concluded that the mere difference in preference, regardless of
reason, was sufficient to establish polarized voting."34 Justice White
argued that this approach confused "interest-group politics" with "a
rule hedging against racial discrimination."'35  Justice O'Connor
agreed with Justice White, as did other Justices who refused to join
Justice Brennan's plurality opinion on this point.3 6 As one lower
court has observed, the differences among these views "cuts deep,
130. Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124,153 (1971).
131. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630,661 (1993) (White, J., dissenting).
132. Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 109 (1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
133. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 97-417, at 33 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177,211.
This important Senate report accompanying the 1982 Amendments cited these earlier
cases and noted that the Court required a distinction "between situations in which racial
politics play an excessive role in the electoral process, and communities in which they do
not."
134. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 60-61 (1986) (plurality opinion of Brennan, J.)
(finding that the district court's approach, which tested data from three election years in
each district, satisfied the proper legal standard).
135. Id. at 83 (White, J., concurring).
136. Id. at 100-01 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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reflecting quite different visions of voting rights and their statutory
treatment. ' 137 The lower courts for a time followed Justice Brennan's
approach, but have since fragmented. 38
The voting patterns that make coalitional districts possible also
might mean that the courts will no longer be able to avoid confronting
these fundamental normative questions. As whites vote in less
unified ways, and as black candidates lose when Democrats lose and
win when they win, the relationship of partisan preferences to the
concept of polarized voting will become more pressing. This Article
assumes that voting should still be considered racially polarized,
within the meaning of the VRA. But the rise of coalitional district
possibilities also raises the prior, more profound question of whether
the VRA should apply-whether its predicate of polarized voting
should be understood to be present-in places where one-third of
whites cross racial lines and vote for black candidates at nearly the
same rate as white Democratic candidates. Districts could still be
designed in such places that encouraged coalitions across racial lines,
but these districts would result from legislative choice, not VRA
obligation.'39
IV. IS VOTING-RIGHTS LAW AT WAR WITH ITSELF?
Voting-rights law in the 2000s might respond in one of two ways
to the emergence of social-scientific findings that suggest that in some
contexts, coalitional districts, rather than safe ones, now enable
minority voters equal electoral opportunities. The law might move
toward an intensively functional, context-specific approach. That is
the approach that the Supreme Court itself has endorsed in its leading
precedent under the VRA, and it is the approach most academic
commentators have long encouraged.40 In that case, the VRA might
be understood to require state and local governments to draw
coalitional districts, when voting is polarized, even if safe districts
cannot be drawn. The effect would be to increase the descriptive
representation of minorities in political bodies, assuming social
137. League of United Latin Am. Citizens (LULAC) v. Clements, 999 F.2d 831, 857
(5th Cir. 1993) (en banc), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1071 (1994).
138. Most lower courts followed Justice Brennan's approach, but in LULAC, the Fifth
Circuit held that VRA plaintiffs must disprove partisan politics as the explanation for
racially divergent candidate preferences. Id. at 859-61.
139. Complicated constitutional questions might be raised about whether race-
conscious districting, even to produce districts designed to require interracial coalitions to
elect candidates, meet the Court's current standards for race-conscious state action.
140. See, e.g., GROFMAN ET AL., supra note 15, at 82-109.
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scientists are right in projecting the dynamics of racial voting patterns.
At the same time, that functional approach might suggest that there is
no impermissible "retrogression" under section 5 of the VRA if a
jurisdiction recasts a safe district of the 1990s into a coalitional district
in the 2000s, as long as the evidence shows that the coalitional district
will afford an equal opportunity to elect. In addition, on the
constitutional side, this functional approach to Shaw could lead courts
to find safe districts insufficiently narrowly tailored where coalitional
districts would suffice. Thus, this functional approach would, on the
one hand, legally require jurisdictions to draw more coalitional
districts, while at the same time it would permit covered jurisdictions
more flexibility in moving away from safe districts and, perhaps,
constitutionally prohibit jurisdictions in general from intentionally
designing safe districts where coalitional districts would suffice.
What would the net political effects of a consistent functional
approach to the law be? In essence there would be a renaissance of a
form of election district that all but disappeared, under legal
command, in the 1990s: districts in which minority voters were a third
of the voting population and white voters were two thirds. The
elimination of these districts in the 1990s redistricting was precipitous,
intended, and the direct consequence of legal obligation. In the
South, for example, between 1990 and 1992, when new plans went
into effect, there were eighteen fewer congressional districts, ninety
fewer state house districts, and twenty-two fewer state senate districts
with black populations between 30% and 50%.141 Indeed, after the
1990 redistricting, only two congressional districts in the South had
30% to 50% black voting-age populations (and non-Hispanic whites
filling out the district).42 If coalitional districts become a partial
substitute for some safe districts in the 2000s, this decade might see a
revival of this recently-lost form of district; if new coalitional districts
were created where safe districts had not existed before, the 2000
redistricting process would yield many more coalitional districts than
141. Handley et al., supra note 56, at 33. These districts were replaced, on the one
hand, with majority-minority districts, and on the other, with districts from which nearly
all black voters had been removed. There was also a precipitous increase in districts with
less than a 10% black population after the 1990s redistricting; in the South, there were
nineteen more of these nearly all white districts for Congress, thirty-seven more for state
senates, and sixty-nine more for state houses. Outside the South, there were two more
such less-than 10% black districts for Congress, forty more for state senates, and twenty-
four more for state houses. Id. at 32.
142. After the initial 1990 redistricting, four congressional districts in the South had a
30% to 50% black voting-age population, but in two of these, black and Hispanic voters
jointly constituted a majority. Lublin, Racial Redistricting, supra note 39, at 184.
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the number of safe districts that existed in the 1990s. In terms of
political effects, this functionally-oriented legal framework ought to
increase the descriptive representation of minorities-despite the
appearance that "dismantling" safe districts would have and the
possible outcry it might initially provoke. 43 If the social-scientific
analyses are correct, coalitional districts, in the appropriate
circumstances, will generate an equal opportunity for minority
communities to elect candidates of choice. Safe districts currently do
so as well, of course, but if safe districts are replaced with coalitional
ones, and new coalitional districts are increased on top of that, the net
effect would be-assuming the data are correct-to increase
meaningful political opportunities for minority communities.
If courts take a functional approach to one set of these issues, the
always-insistent legal pressure for "consistency" and "congruence"
144
will incline courts toward this functional approach across the board.
Agenda-sequencing issues might present these issues in any number
of different orders to the courts, and temporarily, a disequilibrium
might emerge; some issues might be treated functionally, others not.
But over time, it seems likely that congruent legal treatment of
coalitional districts would emerge. Proponents of reading section 2 of
the VRA to require coalitional districts-such as the social scientists
whose work I discuss in this Article-would have to accept that safe
districts might not be required to avoid retrogression under section 5
and might be unconstitutional under Shaw. Conversely, those who
would argue that Shaw should permit continued use of the safe-
districting strategy will face difficulties in convincing courts to adopt a
functional approach to section 2 of the VRA in isolation; as a result,
this stance will make it unlikely courts will read section 2 to require
coalitional districts.
But as all the issues raised above suggests, the functional
approach would also be deeply destabilizing. By the end of the 1990s,
a settlement seemed to have emerged around at least one issue in the
143. In the recent New Jersey state redistricting battle, national civil rights
organizations initially objected to the Reapportionment Commission's decision to create
some coalitional districts where safe districts could have been created, but these
organizations quickly turned around and withdrew their objections, presumably after
being convinced by local political officials and others that these coalitional districts were in
the interest of minority voters. See Page v. Bartels, 144 F. Supp. 2d 346, 355 (D.N.J. 2001)
(holding that the redistricting plan would not impair or prevent minorities from electing
their chosen representatives and did not violate the VRA).
144. Adarand Constr., Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 223-24 (1995) (emphasizing
skepticism, consistency, and congruity as the Court's three established general principles
with respect to governmental racial classifications).
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contentious voting-rights field: safe districts were required where
other elements of the VRA were established and safe districts were
constitutionally permitted, subject to constraints not centered on the
population sizes of such districts. Given all the other freighted and
complex issues that will be up for grabs already in the 2000s, are
courts going to be willing to create further uncertainty by putting the
issue of coalitional versus safe districts up for grabs as well-whatever
the findings of social science show? Redistricting is currently
proceeding on the taken-for-granted assumption that the safe
districting strategy of the 1990s remains, from a legal point of view,
secure. If courts start taking a functional approach to these issues,
much of that redistricting, in areas with significant minority
populations, will be put in jeopardy. Beyond the other legal issues
that will already draw courts into extensive oversight of much of this
redistricting, will courts destabilize the redistricting process even
further, and involve themselves even more extensively, by
unscrambling the safe districting approach and requiring re-
redistricting for a second round in the 2000s? The Supreme Court
itself does not appear anxious to become more deeply involved in
voting-rights issues; the Court regularly denies certiorari or
summarily affirms in cases that raise important issues.145  Lower
courts might be similarly exhausted with the complexity of voting-
rights issues and resist major new issues that would require continual
judicial involvement with factually complex matters that an even
more concertedly functional approach would require.
The second way, therefore, in which courts might respond to
emerging patterns of racial dynamics in voting is, in essence, to ignore
them. Instead of a functional approach, courts might well take a not-
readily dismissed formal approach; here too, the same reasons suggest
that courts will do so across the board if they do with respect to any
one legal issue concerning coalitional districts. This formal approach
would entail refusing to look below the surface of safe districts to
determine if other districts perform the same functions. Thus, states
would continue to be permitted, and probably required, to use safe
districts to avoid retrogression under section 5. Shaw would continue
to permit safe districts to be used constitutionally. And section 2 of
the VRA would apply only when safe districts, in which minorities are
truly a majority of the voting-age population, could be constructed;
the VRA would impose no obligation to create coalitional districts.
145. See, e.g., King v. State Bd. of Elections, 979 F. Supp. 619,621 (N.D. fll. 1997), affd
without opinion, 522 U.S. 1087 (1998).
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Given all the reasons that press courts toward bright-line, easily
administered rules in this area, experience suggests courts will find
this formal approach attractive. Such an approach would also not
destabilize the precarious legal status quo of the late 1990s, despite
newly emergent insights into actual voting behavior that challenge the
premises on which that status quo was constructed.
But when we step back from the intricate legal issues that
constitute voting-rights law to ask where we now stand, 46 what will
emerge from the 2000 process might be distressingly ironic. If courts
and other actors do indeed adopt the formal approach, the law will
have frozen us into a politics of "safe" districting, in which minority
voters are concentrated into some districts in which they make up a
majority and, to achieve that end, are present only in small numbers
in all other districts. To achieve more descriptive representation in
legislative bodies, given polarized voting, we would have created
districts in which candidates can get elected without significant
support across racial lines. The 1990s saw the virtual elimination,
under legal compulsion, of election districts in which black voters
constituted 30% to 50% of the population.147 That might have been a
necessary response in an era in which polarized voting would
otherwise have had the consequence of electing no more than 1%
minority officeholders. But if the social scientists are correct that
coalitional districts-the very 30% to 50% minority districts
eliminated in the 1990s-now do enable minority voters to have equal
opportunity at electoral politics, then such districts offer the prospect
of integrated polities electing candidates across racial lines with
biracial support.
The vision of this kind of polity, at the microlevel of individual
districts or the macrolevel of the political community as a whole, has
long been thought the appropriate animating goal of the VRA. This
view of ultimate aims has been shared across the conventionally
defined political spectrum. Among the strongest proponents of the
interpretation of the VRA that prevailed before Shaw, single-race
controlled safe districts were justified as "admittedly the 'politics of
the second best' "--a "necessary evil in a color-conscious world."'
148
Among those most concerned about race-conscious design of
democratic institutions, including the Justices who developed the
146. The issues raised here largely originate in the 1982 Amendments to the VRA and
reflect 20 years of experimentation since federal law banned vote dilution. The issues do
not go to the implementation of the original 1965 VRA.
147. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
148. GROFMAN ET AL., supra note 15, at 136.
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Shaw constraints on racial districting, the articulated concern has
been that "[r]acial gerrymandering, even for remedial purposes, may
balkanize us into competing racial factions;" it is for that reason that
"race-based districting by our state legislatures demands close judicial
scrutiny.' 1 49 A decade after these statements, coalitional districts
might offer the prospect of a more integrated, cross-racial set of
political alliances that would ensure minority representation-
perhaps at even higher levels than at present-without requiring
resort any longer to the "politics of the second best." Proponents of
the VRA might be heartened by that development. Proponents of
Shaw might similarly be pleased if integrated, rather than single-race
controlled, districts are now sufficient.
Indeed, if there is anything a Supreme Court that is usually
divided on voting-rights issues agrees on, it appears to be these
principles. Thus, in writing for an unanimous Court, Justice Souter
recently expressed these points forcefully:
It bears recalling, however, that for all the virtues of
majority-minority districts as remedial devices, they rely on
a quintessentially race-conscious calculus aptly described as
the "politics of the second best." If the lesson of Gingles is
that society's racial and ethnic cleavages sometimes
necessitate majority-minority districts to ensure equal
political and electoral opportunity, that should not obscure
the fact that there are communities in which minority
citizens are able to form coalitions with voters from other
racial and ethnic groups, having no need to be a majority
within a single district in order to elect candidates of their
choice. Those candidates might not represent perfection to
every minority voter, but minority voters are not immune
from the obligation to pull, haul, and trade to find common
political ground, the virtue of which is not to be slighted in
applying a statute meant to hasten the waning of racism in
American politics.150
But the irony is that voting-rights law itself might now stand in
the way of that transformation. If courts continue to view safe
districts as both required statutorily and immune from constitutional
challenge (on population grounds), redistricting officials will
understandably consider such districts to be safe harbors protecting
their plans from legal challenge. If courts view the judicial role as
necessitating administration of voting rights through bright-line
149. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630,657 (1993).
150. Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1020 (1994) (citations omitted).
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rules-the rule that safe districts are required and permitted-this
formal approach will lock "safe districting" into place in the 2000s,
despite apparent evidence that such districts might no longer, at least
in all places, be necessary. In this way, voting-rights law would turn
out to be at war with itself: the substantive principles of the VRA
and the Constitution would insist that the law reflect current
functional realities regarding actual voting behavior along racial lines,
while the judicial imperatives of easily administered, bright-line rules
and avoidance of dramatically destabilizing new doctrines, would
compel a more formal approach. The latter would result in bypassing
effective, integrated, coalitional districts for continued reliance on
safe districts no longer tied to the substantive purposes of either the
VRA or the constraints of Shaw.
Courts will therefore face complex choices, ones in which serious
costs accompany any decision, as they assess the new decade's
representative institutions. At one extreme, they can adopt a
functional approach to voting rights; the result could be reopening
many districting plans now being drawn and constant judicial
entanglement with issues of race and politics throughout much of the
next decade. At the other extreme, courts can adopt a formal
approach; the result could be to entrench a now crude structure for
ensuring fair representation that abandons integrated electoral
politics, even where effective, in favor of a system of monoracial
dominated electoral politics, where the race that dominates in some
places is white, in some black. On the eve of the new decade of
redistricting, the way courts make that choice will shape not just the
relation between law and social science, but the kind of electoral
politics and political culture we have, on the difficult issue of race and
politics, in the first decade of the 2000s.
2002] 1573
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